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ABSTRACT
It is a near scientific certainty that sea levels will rise between one and eight feet
by the end of the century. This will wreak havoc on our infrastructure, ecology, and
public health, and cause an unquantifiable amount of economic damage. Given the
inevitability of sea level rise, state and local governments must facilitate the managed
retreat of people and property away from vulnerable coastal areas. However,
governments’ ability to facilitate managed retreat comes head-to-head with the
Takings Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions, which state that the
government may not take private property without paying just compensation. This
Comment analyzes two methods of managed retreat: (1) use of eminent domain and
(2) implementation of rebuilding restrictions. Because eminent domain is costly,
politically fraught, and can have the effect of marginalizing already vulnerable
populations, local governments should instead implement rebuilding restrictions to
facilitate managed retreat. Rebuilding restrictions are an optimal managed retreat
tool because they gradually move populations away from the coast and are unlikely
to result in successful takings claims that require the government to pay just
compensation under either Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council or Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York. Without having to pay just compensation
under the Taking Clause according to fair market value of the property, the
government is able to develop an alternative means of reallocating coastal
communities that is more equitably attuned to the economic and social needs of
vulnerable populations.
INTRODUCTION
“If you can see the sea, the sea can see you.”1
Imagine you have a house on the coast of Maine. Maybe the house has been in
your family for generations as a summer home; perhaps you live in it full time. Over
time you start to notice changes. They happen slowly at first, but then you notice the
changes more and more: the king tides are getting a little higher, winter storms push
seaweed and debris a little closer to your home every year, and the saltwater gets
closer and closer to your well. Next, a hurricane hits. The rough, rising waters take
out your wharf and flood your basement and first floor. The water reaches your
electrical and septic systems, short-circuiting the former and flooding the latter. You
have no electricity or phone lines—the road to your house floods, cutting you off
from vital emergency services. If you are lucky, there are no injuries sustained, and
you have enough supplies and food to wait for the waters to recede.
When the waters retreat, your house is waterlogged. Everything in your
basement and first floor is ruined, covered in thick, muddy sediment that dries and
becomes airborne. Mold starts to grow on everything. You repair as best you can,
wait for the water to come again, and think that next time, maybe you will not be so
lucky.
In early December 2019, the United Nations Secretary-General, António
1. ORRIN H. PILKEY & KEITH C. PILKEY, SEA LEVEL RISE: A SLOW TSUNAMI ON AMERICA’S
SHORES 136 (2019).
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Guterres declared that, concerning climate change, “the point of no return is no
longer over the horizon.”2 While the statement intended to highlight the critical need
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as quickly as possible, 3 it also highlights a
parallel issue. As we make efforts to reduce emissions, we must also think about
ways to protect people and property if “the point of no return,” the point at which we
can no longer reverse the effects of climate change, does occur. Scientists believe
that even if we reduce carbon emissions entirely, we will not be able to stop rising
sea levels. 4 Thus, in many ways, we have already reached the projected “point of
no return.” The inevitability of sea level rise means that we need to actively relocate
people who live in coastal areas that are vulnerable to sea level rise. This is an issue
of great concern for Maine, which has 3,478 miles of coastline and a vibrant coastal
economy.5
This Comment explores two primary methods of controlling coastal
development as a means of facilitating managed retreat: (1) eminent domain and (2)
rebuilding restrictions. Both eminent domain and rebuilding restrictions raise
interesting legal questions vis-à-vis the Takings Clauses of both state and federal
constitutions, which require the government to pay just compensation if private
property is taken for a public purpose. 6 Ultimately, the government should select
methods of managed retreat that avoid the just compensation obligation under the
Takings Clause. In avoiding the Takings Clause, the government would be able to
use its discretion to compensate coastal communities in more just and ethical ways
that appropriately address the consequences of climate change.
Part I lays out the current scientific data on climate change and sea level rise,
the reason that sea levels are rising, and the projected rate of rise over the next
century. This part will also address the consequences of sea level rise, including the
economic and health impacts and infrastructural implications. Part II provides an
overview of the intersection of managed retreat and the Takings Clauses. This
section will address the protections created by the Takings Clauses, and why any
discussion of managed retreat requires a takings analysis. Part III discusses the first
managed retreat tool, eminent domain. This section looks primarily at whether
condemnation of coastal property to prevent harm from rising sea levels qualifies as
a “public use” and is constitutional. Part IV explores the second managed retreat
tool, rebuilding restrictions, and whether adopting these types of ordinances would
constitute a regulatory taking that requires just compensation under the Takings
Clause. Finally, this Comment concludes by discussing why it is important for the
2. Imran Rahman-Jones, Climate Change: The COP25 Talks Trying to Change the World, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-50629410 [https://perma.cc/N9M5-LAFR].
3. See id.
4. Oliver Milman, Sea Levels Set to Keep Rising for Centuries Even if Emissions Targets Met,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2019. 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/06/sealevel-rise-centuries-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/ZPK6-239Y]; Cindy Han, How Sea Level Rise Will
Change Maine’s Coast, ME. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.mainepublic.org/post/how-sealevel-rise-will-change-maines-coast [https://perma.cc/2BHY-F6K2] (transcript on file with author).
5. Shoreline Mileage of the United States, NOAA OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://coast.noaa.
gov/data/docs/states/shorelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG29-HQF2] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V; ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; see also Steven Gow Calabresi et al.,
Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in Modern-Day
Consensus of the States?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 49, 102-03 (2018).
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government to avoid paying just compensation under the Takings Clause. In light
of climate change, it is inequitable to require the government to pay property owners
according to fair market value of their property, which effectively gives people with
the most expensive properties the most money, regardless of need. Equity demands
that the government be able to decide who needs compensation most, thus providing
a more appropriate metric than fair market value of property. The government
would, therefore, be able to determine compensation for those impacted by managed
retreat based on a different standard, one that does not perpetuate economic
inequality.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE & RISING SEA LEVELS
“Climate Change,” as its name would suggest, is the shift in climate that
“occurs within a complex realm of environmental interactions, often with
unpredictable results.”7 The consequences of climate change can range from rising
temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, droughts and heatwaves, extreme
weather events, to, finally, sea level rise.8 While each of these effects poses a severe
risk to the future of our planet, sea level rise has unique and complex implications
for the State of Maine and the people who reside along the State’s 3,478 miles of
coastline.9
A. Sea Level Rise
Global sea level rise is not a new phenomenon. Climate data from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) suggest that between 1870 and 2013,
sea levels rose over 225 millimeters or nearly 9 inches. 10 In Maine, specifically, sea

7. GEORGE L. JACOBSON ET AL., MAINE’S CLIMATE FUTURE: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT 3 (Univ. of
Me. 2009), https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1174&context=ers_
facpub [https://perma.cc/N5HE-ATWG]; see also U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, THE IMPACTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON HUMAN HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016), https://health2016.
globalchange.gov/low/ClimateHealth2016_FullReport_small.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UTY-28NJ]
[hereinafter USGCRP Health Report]. Likening the entirety of Earth’s history to a single calendar year,
Elizabeth Rush eloquently describes the horror of climate change in this way:
[T]he . . . Anthropocene [era] . . . begins, launching a geologic period defined by the
complete and utter dominance of certain human beings and our endless accumulation of
resources. In that fraction of a second, we opened the earth’s veins, exhume as much
energy as possible, and pump various byproducts into the air, causing the atmosphere to
warm twenty times faster than normal. We cause the polar ice caps to melt, the oceans to
heat, and the coastline to change its shape. We alter the makeup of the biosphere, the
twelve-mile-deep sliver of the earth that is home to all known life that has ever existed in
the entire universe. “Abundant” and “geographically widespread” are two ways of
describing the extent of humans’ impact on the planet. Lately I have been wondering
whether the descriptor “index fossil” might also soon apply.
ELIZABETH A. RUSH, RISING: DISPATCHES FROM THE NEW AMERICAN SHORE 54-55 (2018).
8. NASA, The Effects of Climate Change, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/
[https://perma.cc/6ESF-HEMN] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
9. Shoreline Mileage of the United States, supra note 5.
10. National Ocean Service, Is Sea Level Rising?, NOAA, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts
/sealevel.html [https://perma.cc/R5ZR-S6NB] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
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levels have increased by approximately eight inches since 1950.11 While sea levels
have been rising for the last century, data released by the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) in September 2019 states with statistical “virtual[]
certain[ty]”that global mean sea levels will not only continue to rise in the future, but
will do so at an accelerated rate.12 However, rates of sea level rise may dip, spike,
and fluctuate over time, potentially making it difficult to predict and plan.13
1. Why Are Sea Levels Rising?
Sea levels rise as a result of a complex combination of factors, including thermal
expansion, volumetric increase, and interactions between the land and ocean. 14 First,
sea levels rise as ocean waters warm, a process that is known as thermal expansion.
As temperature increases, the water decreases in density, which causes the volume
of the water to expand while the actual mass of the ocean remains the same. 15 A
second contributing factor is an actual increase in the amount of water in the ocean
caused by melting glaciers and ice sheets in the Arctic and Greenland that contribute
to the overall volume of the ocean.16 Melting is now projected to be the dominant
source of global sea level rise. 17
Third, approximately ten percent of sea level rise is caused by the complex
interactions between the land and sea,18 such as vertical motion of tectonic plates and
changes in the earth’s gravity;19 wind patterns;20 ice, snow, surface water, and
groundwater that increase ocean volume; 21 and Gulf Stream currents.22 Finally, sea
11. Han, supra note 4; see also JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 21; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE OCEAN AND CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 55 (2019),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/3/2019/12/SROCC_FullReport_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJ87-E7MH] [hereinafter IPCC Report 2019].
12. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 55-56. The IPCC Report defines “virtual certainty” as
having a “99-100% probability.” Id. at 42 n.1. Over the last two decades, the accelerated rate of sea
level rise has already become evident. For example, over the previous twenty years, sea levels have
risen at a rate of 0.13 inches per year, which is approximately twice the average rate of rise documented
in the eighty years before that. GREATER PORTLAND COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, TOWN OF CHEBEAGUE
ISLAND SEA LEVEL RISE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 8 (2016), https://www.townofchebeagueisland
.org/vertical/sites/%7B984705D3-C709-4324-9040-19247D095968%7D/uploads/2017-04-07_ltr_from
_VD-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH2T-2T57] [hereinafter GPCG].
13. See GPCG, supra note 12.
14. See IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 330-32, 339 (“For the periods 1970-2015, 1993-2015
and 2006-2015 the simulated contributions from thermal expansion, glacier mass loss and Greenland
[surface mass balance] explain respectively 84%, 81%, and 77% of the observed [global mean sea
level].”); Han, supra note 4; JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
15. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 331; see JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 17.
16. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 335 (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads
/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF5H-NKHW] [hereinafter USGCRP Climate Report].
17. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11.
18. See Han, supra note 4; see also USGCRP Climate Report, supra note 16, at 335.
19. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 331-32.
20. Id. at 360.
21. Id. at 338.
22. USGCRP Climate Report, supra note 16; Han, supra note 4; see also Maine’s Sea Level is
Rising, SEA LEVEL RISE.ORG, https://sealevelrise.org/states/maine/ [https://perma.cc/BQ2L-C79L] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2020) (stating that most flooding occurs in winter).
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level rise is made worse by human influences, such as infrastructure, development, 23
and habitat degradation, that exacerbate the effects of sea level rise in particular
locations.24
2. Projected Sea Level Rise
While measuring current sea levels is relatively simple, sea level rise projections
are significantly more challenging to calculate reliably. The projections are
challenging to model primarily because projected sea level rise depends on which
carbon emissions scenario statisticians use in the model. 25 However, the exact rate
of carbon emissions in the future is currently unknown. 26 While it is impossible to
precisely model future sea level rise, it is undisputed that even if humans were to
stop all emissions by 2020, sea levels would still continue to rise.27 The real question
is just by how much.
The lowest projected scenario is a one-foot rise in sea level by 2100.28 Under
this scenario, sea levels will continue to rise at the same rate they are today. 29 On
the other end of the spectrum, the highest projections show that by 2100 sea level
will increase by 8.2 feet, which corresponds to a 1.7 inch per year increase in sea
level rise.30 This latter model accounts for melting in the Arctic.31 Experts in Maine
project a third, catastrophic scenario of localized sea level increase of between 8 and
11 feet over the next 100 years.32 This catastrophic projection is likely to occur if
humans continue “business as usual.”33
3. The Relationship Between Sea Level Rise and Extreme Sea Level Events
Finally, it is impossible to discuss sea level rise without also discussing storm
surge and severe storms, which are intertwined. Naturally occurring “extreme sea
level events” such as king tides, storm surge, and hurricanes are made worse by rising
sea levels and lead to more significant damage to coastal regions. 34 As a result of
climate change, scientists expect that the “100-year coastal storm” that used to occur
once a century will occur every two to three years. 35
23. Prosperity after World War II enabled people to buy second homes along the coast, drastically
expanding coastal development. GILBERT M. GAUL, THE GEOGRAPHY OF RISK: EPIC STORMS, RISING
SEAS, AND THE COST OF AMERICA’S COASTS 5 (2019). This development has since accelerated and is
backed by federal and state governments who have incentivized coastal development through tax breaks,
flood insurance subsidies, and infrastructure development. Id.
24. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11.
25. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 55-56; USGCRP Climate Report, supra note 16, at 342.
26. See Han, supra note 4.
27. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 55-56; Milman, supra note 4; Han, supra note 4.
28. USGCRP Climate Report, supra note 16, at 342.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Han, supra note 4.
33. Id.
34. IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 327-28.
35. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 21; see also CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT, ONE CLIMATE FUTURE 23 (2019) (“[The data] illustrates how the historic 25-year 24-hour
storm event is expected to be equivalent to the 16-year storm event in 2050 and to the 13-year in 2100.
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The ultimate takeaway from the most recent sea level rise research is this: (1)
sea levels will continue to rise, (2) extreme sea level events will increase in
frequency, and (3) sea levels will continue to increase even if we collectively reduce
our emissions to zero. Given the severity and inevitability of these events, our
collective thinking on how to address sea level rise needs to place long-term
adaptation strategies front and center.
B. Consequences of Sea Level Rise
The impacts of climate change are so complex that a researcher could make it
her life’s work to explore the effects of climate change on different aspects of human
existence. As such, this section will merely provide a brief overview of these impacts
as a foundation for why states and municipalities need to think more aggressively
about retreat from threatened areas. These effects include economic impacts,
infrastructural damage, ecological degradation and health impacts.
1. Economic Impacts
Economic damage as a result of sea level rise can be divide into two different
categories: (1) the immediate financial harm caused by storms and floods; and (2)
the gradual and projected loss in property values that occur as a result of anticipated
sea level rise. The first category—direct economic harm—is one of the most
prominent consequences of sea level rise. The most extreme example of this type of
financial injury is the destruction of homes, buildings, and infrastructure caused by
severe storms and flooding.36
Across the lower forty-eight states, more than one trillion dollars in property
could be at risk by the end of the century due to proximity to the coast. 37 In Maine,
there are currently 7,000 people at risk for flooding, and by 2050, this number will
increase to 13,000.38 In economic terms, this means that approximately 3.5 billion
dollars in property in Maine is at risk of being destroyed by sea level rise. 39 Flooding
and damage to property is also likely to have negative impacts on businesses and
tourism in Maine, especially if beaches disappear as a result of sea level rise.40

Likewise, the historic 100-year 24-hour storm is expected to be equivalent to the 52-year in 2050 and to
the 42-year in 2100.”) [hereinafter Vulnerability Assessment]; IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 324
(projecting, with high statistical confidence, that extreme sea level events that were once rare will occur
regularly by 2100).
36. Hurricane Sandy alone caused approximately $50 billion in damage. Robin Kundis Craig, Of
Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: The Public Health Police Power as a Means of Defending Against
“Takings” Challenges to Coastal Regulation, 22 N.Y.U. ENV’T L. J. 84, 103 (2014).
37. David Charns, Scientists Issue Dire Warning for Coastal Maine Communities, WMTW (June
19, 2018, 3:58 AM), https://www.wmtw.com/article/scientists-issue-dire-warning-for-coastal-mainecommunities/21610046# [https://perma.cc/7C8B-FVAV].
38. Id.
39. Id. In New York and San Francisco $7.7 and $8.6 billion dollar in property, respectively, will
be lost by 2045. PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 33. In the next fifteen years, the United Sates will
lose $63 billion in property because of rising sea levels and flooding. Id.
40. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 22 (stating that in York County, Maine “over 260 businesses
representing $41.6 million in wages are at risk from coastal flooding and the resulting property
destruction and higher insurance costs, although it is possible that long before storm surge reaches the
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In addition to the economic impacts caused by extreme sea level events,
projected sea level rise also drives down the housing market and decreases coastal
property values even if the property has not yet been damaged or flooded. For
example, a recent study isolating the statistical relationship between tidal flooding
and home values shows that between 2005 and 2017, Maine property collectively
lost $69.9 million in value as a result of rising sea levels. 41 Furthermore, homes
located within a quarter-mile of a road that will be completely flooded within 15
years decrease in value by $3.71 per square foot every year. 42
2. Infrastructure
Infrastructural damage is closely tied to economic impacts, as fixing damage to
the infrastructure after a storm requires significant government expenditure. Rising
sea levels are likely to damage the infrastructure in four primary ways: (1) road and
bridge washouts; (2) damage to the electric grid; (3) contamination of water systems;
and (4) ongoing stress to infrastructural systems caused by nuisance flooding.
First, flooding will cut off roadways and wash out bridges, essentially cutting
people off from vital resources.43 From a governmental perspective, flooding and
storms that wash out and damage roads create unplanned and costly repairs. 44 A
study conducted by the United States Department of Transportation found that “27%
of major roads, 9% of rail lines, and 72% of ports are potentially vulnerable to
flooding from [rising] sea-level[s] . . . in the central Gulf Coast region.” 45 In Maine,
many peninsula communities rely on one road in and one road out. As a result, these
communities are vulnerable to isolation if their single-access road floods.46
A second major infrastructural threat caused by rising sea levels is damage to
hotels and restaurants along Route 1, the beaches which draw tourists to Southern Maine will have
disappeared”).
41. First Street Foundation, Rising Seas Swallow $403 Million in New England Home Values (Jan.
22, 2019), https://firststreet.org/press/rising-seas-swallow-403-million-in-new-england-home-values/
[https://perma.cc/2X8V-UZRN]; see also Steven A. McAlpine & Jeremy R. Porter, Estimating Recent
Local Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in
Miami-Dade, Florida, 37 POP. RES. & POL’Y REV. 871, 875-87 (2018) (explaining the background and
methodology used to assess changes in home values); Nathan Strout, Study Says Sea Level Rise is
Costing Bath Homeowners, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/23/study-says-sea-level-rise-is-costing-bath-homeowners/
[https://perma.cc/QM6N-U87H]; Lori Valigra, Rising Seas Swallowed $70 Million Maine Home Values,
Study Says, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://bangordailynews.com/2019/01/22/business/rising-seas-to-swallow-70-million-in-maine-homevalues-study-says/ [https://perma.cc/E3NJ-YEHG (according to the study Bath, Maine, was the city
hardest hit. Homes that should be valued at $150,000 are now valued at only $90,000 because of rising
sea levels).
42. McAlpine & Porter, supra note 41; see also Vulnerability Assessment, supra note 35, at 5.
43. See Island Inst., Waypoints - Connect: Infrastructure Indicators for Maine’s Coast and Islands,
ISSUE 8-9 (Feb. 17, 2020) https://issuu.com/theislandinstitute/docs/waypoints_2019_connect
[https://perma.cc/V6JF-7N6U].
44. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 54.
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. See, e.g., Island Inst., supra note 43, at 8 (stating that if sea levels rise by two feet, 84% of
roads will be inaccessible in Deer Island cutting off 1,308 addresses; 100% of roads will be cut off in
Stonington making 909 addresses inaccessible; and 97% of roads will be cut off in Georgetown making
932 addresses inaccessible).
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the electric grid. Rising sea levels can short circuit electrical systems leading to
increased risk of fires, which could leave thousands without power for several
months.47 In Maine, a category two hurricane could put thirteen power plants and
fifteen coastal substations at risk, reducing electrical output across the state by
fourteen percent and leading to localized power outages.48 During electricity
blackouts, people often resort to gas generators for power without fully
understanding how to use them safely to avoid a buildup of carbon monoxide. 49 As
a result, electricity blackouts after an extreme sea level event tend to be associated
with high rates of carbon monoxide poisoning. 50
Third, rising sea levels pose a threat to vital water resource systems. As sea
levels rise, saltwater is more likely to permeate groundwater, freshwater wells, and
aquifers, leading to increased salinization of freshwater sources.51 Freshwater
salinization is of particular concern for coastal communities in Maine who may rely
heavily on wells and aquifers.52 Were the Maine coast to experience a hurricane
comparable in strength to Sandy, 53 overflow of saltwater into aquifers would cause
aquifers to be undrinkable for between five and twenty days. 54 Furthermore, rising
sea levels and extreme weather events can overwhelm the capacity of sewage plants,
causing raw sewage to overflow and contaminate vital water sources.55 Raw sewage
can subsequently contaminate drinking water, exposing humans to over 100 different
pathogens.56
While infrastructural damage is most readily apparent during an extreme sea
level event, recurrent weather stressors—such as “nuisance flooding”—tax
infrastructure systems, causing them to deteriorate over time. 57 Continual stress on
storm drainage systems caused by rising sea levels increases the risk of sewage
overflow and water contamination when a severe storm occurs. 58 When an

47. See John Manuel, The Long Road to Recovery: Environmental Health Impacts of Hurricane
Sandy, 121 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. A152, A153 (2013).
48. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESILIENCY ASSESSMENT: CASCO BAY REGION CLIMATE CHANGE
25 (2016).
49. See USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 105.
50. Manuel, supra note 47, at A155.
51. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 61; Craig, supra note 36, at 101.
52. See USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 163.
53. Research suggests that the possibility of another hurricane with comparable strength to Sandy is
not only possible, but that the frequency of such storms is increasing as a result of climate change. See
Ning Lin et al., Hurricane Sandy’s Flood Frequency Increasing From Year 1800 to 2100, 113 PNAS
12071, 12071 (2016); see also Chris Emery, Researchers Predict Growing Number of Hurricane SandyLike Storm Surges in Future, PRINCETON UNIV. (Oct. 10, 2016, 4:15 PM),
https://www.princeton.edu/news/2016/10/10/researchers-predict-growing-number-hurricane-sandystorm-surges-future [https://perma.cc/V8HR-7EBR] (“The worst-case scenario has the frequency [of
Sandy-like storms] increasing by 17 times by the year 2100 . . . .”).
54. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 48, at 24.
55. See Manuel, supra note 47, at A156-57. During Hurricane Sandy, it is estimated that 2.75
billion gallons of untreated sewage flowed from a flooded sewage plant into nearby water sources. Id.
56. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 61.
57. USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 105; see also PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 29.
58. USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 105, 164 (stating that deterioration caused by rising
sea levels is compounded by the effects of a naturally aging infrastructure system. It is projected that
over the next thirty years, the majority of pipes used for drinking water will need to be replaced.).
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infrastructural failure occurs, there is rarely a “single point of failure,” 59 such as the
destruction of a road or shut down of a power plant. Instead, what often occurs is a
“cascading failure,” whereby a breakdown in one piece of the complex
infrastructural web causes disruptions in other parts of the larger system. 60
Cascading failures eliminate critical response systems, which then diminish a
community’s capacity to respond adaptively.61
3. Ecology
In addition to the built environment, rising sea levels can devastate coastal
regions’ ecological health, which influences the degree to which the natural
environment can flexibly adapt to changing conditions. For example, salt marshes
and wetlands not only provide habitats for birds and fish but also serve as vital natural
flood protection.62 Where humans have left marshes and wetlands untouched, these
ecosystems are able to adapt to rising sea levels. 63
However, coastal development and human interference with these ecosystems
has harmed the ability of these natural environments to respond adaptively to climate
change.64 When humans begin to change the environment through “ditching,
plugging, draining, diking, culverting, and developing alongside and in these unique
landscapes—they are yanking, even severing the ropes that tie the marsh together,”65
thereby impacting the marsh’s ability to keep pace with environmental changes. 66 If
wetlands are unable to keep pace with sea level rise, they become inundated with salt
water, which then causes marsh grass to rot.67 As the marsh rots, the ground
collapses, releasing all of the carbon stored by the marsh back into the atmosphere. 68
To stop the cycle of ecological degradation, marshes must be given the space to

59. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 48, at 43.
60. USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 106.
61. See id. at 104.
62. PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 76; Vulnerability Assessment, supra note 35, at 82;
JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 21; Jennifer Howard et al., Clarifying the Role of Coastal and Marine
Systems in Climate Mitigation, 15 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 42, 48 (2017).
63. Tyler C. Coverdale et al., Indirect Human Impacts Reverse Centuries of Carbon Sequestration
and Salt Marsh Accretion, 9 PLOS ONE, Mar. 27, 2014, at 1, 1; PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 76;
IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11.
64. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441-43 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining
that 400 plaintiffs brought suit against the federal government, arguing that construction and dredging of
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) destroyed buffer wetlands and caused erosion that resulted
in the levees breaching during Hurricane Katrina); Theresa Chan et al., Determining Climate
Responsibility: Government Liability for Hurricane Katrina? 49 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10005, 10006 (2019) (detailing the environmental consequences of the man-made MRGO); Christopher
R. Dyess, Off with His Head: The King Can Do No Wrong, Hurricane Katrina, and the Mississippi Gulf
Outlet, 9 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 302, 315 (2014).
65. RUSH, supra note 7, at 59; see also Coverdale et al., supra note 63, at 2 (describing in Table 1
the different types of direct and indirect effects of human activity on marsh carbon sequestration).
66. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 21.
67. See RUSH, supra note 7, at 55.
68. Id. at 57; see also Ashley N. Bulseco et al., Nitrate Addition Stimulates Microbial
Decomposition of Organic Matter in Salt Marsh Sediments, 25 GLOB. CHANGE BIOLOGY 3224, 3225
(2019).
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migrate inland to regain their equilibrium. 69 Doing so may ultimately require
returning developed land to its natural state. 70
4. Health Impacts
As the previous sections demonstrate, the consequences of sea level rise are
complicated and interconnected. Except for drowning, many health impacts of sea
level rise are not directly caused by rising waters. 71 Instead, many of the health
consequences are a result of secondary effects.72 Common secondary health impacts
include respiratory problems caused by dried sediment, 73 mold growth in flooded
homes, 74 carbon monoxide poisoning, and long term mental health problems such
as depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. 75 In most situations,
people are exposed to multiple factors at the same time, causing “compounding or
cascading health impacts.”76
Furthermore, not all people will experience the impacts of sea level rise in the
same ways. Researchers project with high statistical confidence that climate change
will exacerbate existing social and health vulnerabilities, putting specific populations
such as people with disabilities, people of color, children, low-income communities,
pregnant women, and the elderly more at risk.77 These same vulnerabilities must
also be taken into account in identifying ways to mitigate rising sea levels. More
broadly, the cumulative impact of repeat storms and the emotional effects of being
continuously concerned with climate change can take a toll on health.78
C. Managed Retreat from Coastal Areas
Given the inevitability of sea level rise and its harmful consequences, “the
relocation of coastal communities is no longer a question of if, but when and how.” 79
Climate change conversations must, therefore, include discussions of how we

69. RUSH, supra note 7, at 59.
70. Id.; cf. Vulnerability Assessment, supra note 35, at 82 (explaining the importance of preserving
and protecting marsh areas as natural barriers against rising sea levels).
71. Manuel, supra note 47, at A153.
72. See Kathryn Lane et al., Health Effects of Coastal Storms and Flooding in Urban Areas: A
Review and Vulnerability Assessment, 2013 J. ENV’T & PUB. HEALTH 1, 10 (2013).
73. Manuel, supra note 47, at A156.
74. Id. at A153, A157.
75. USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 220-21.
76. Id. at 29.
77. See PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 36; USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7, at 29, 104
(“Poverty is a key risk factor, and the poor are disproportionately affected by extreme events. Lowincome individuals may have fewer financial resources and social capital . . . to help them prepare for,
respond to, and recover from an extreme event.”).
78. USGCRP Health Report, supra note 7; see also PILKEY & PILKEY, supra note 1, at 37.
79. See Lydialyle Gibson, Scholars Advocate “Managed Retreat”—Before Climate Change Sinks
Coastlines, HARV. MAG. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://harvardmagazine.com/2019/08/scholars-advocatemanaged-retreat-from-coastlines-before-climate-change-makes-them [https://perma.cc/Z8BQ-DXZA];
see also Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the
American City, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2011) (explaining that because climate change is
inevitable, governments must find ways to minimize its impact on communities).
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sustainably, efficiently, and consciously retreat from at-risk coastal areas.80
Movement away from coastal areas is already happening. However, it is occurring
on an ad hoc basis with little consideration of broader societal goals and the inequity
and marginalization that can occur without preplanning. 81 Therefore, the
conversation needs to shift from how we are going to rebuild and protect coastal
areas to whether we even should.82 The longer communities put off planning for
movement away from high-risk coastal areas, the harder it will become to adequately
respond to the risks of rising sea levels in an equitable, efficient, and communitycentered way.83
Far from being a depressing acknowledgment of failure, managed retreat
presents a rare opportunity for communities to redesign their cities in sustainable and
equitable ways. 84 The United States has a sordid history of using land use planning
and housing policy in racially and economically discriminatory ways. 85 Even though
these discriminatory policies have since ended, the impacts of these policies are
encoded into the very structure of our communities, cities, and towns and continue
to persist to this day.86 Ultimately, undoing these impacts means rebuilding and
restructuring our communities and where people live. 87 Managed retreat is a rare

80. See, e.g., Andrea McArdle, Managing “Retreat”: The Challenges of Adapting Land Use to
Climate Change, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 605, 618-621 (2018) (providing an overview of
managed retreat in the land use context); Lewis Van Alstyne III, Changing Winds and Rising Tides on
Beach Renourishment in Florida: Short-Term Alternatives and Long-Term Sustainable Solutions Using
Law and Policy From Florida and Nearby States, 11 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 283, 307-308 (2016)
(identifying retreat as a potential response to rising sea levels).
81. A.R. Siders et al., The Case for Strategic and Managed Climate Retreat, 365 SCI. MAG. 761,
761 (2019); see also Eli Keene, Resources for Relocation: In Search of a Coherent Federal Policy on
Resettling Climate-Vulnerable Communities, 48 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 119, 147-48 (2018) (explaining that
the number of communities needing to relocate is only going to grow, which means that a coherent
federal funding plan for relocation is needed).
82. See Gibson, supra note 79.
83. See id.
84. Id. But see Edward P. Richards, The Societal Impacts of Climate Anomalies During the Past
50,000 Years and their Implications for Solastalgia and Adaptation to Future Climate Change, 18
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131, 162 (2018) (explaining that managed retreat is not easy in part
because of the psychological attachment to a particular location and “sense of place”); McArdle, supra
note 80, at 625 (stating that there are non-economic impacts of mandated managed retreat, such as
psychological effects).
85. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 13, 44, 65 (2017) (explaining that some of these racially
discriminatory practices include the Federal Housing Administration only insuring mortgages for
racially segregated neighborhoods, adoption of zoning rules that segregated families, and providing
mortgages only to areas where there was physical separation between races); Jon C. Dubin, From
Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of
Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1993) (explaining that local governments imposed “expulsive
zoning” whereby implementation of “higher” zoning is used to force out low-income residents).
86. See Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through
Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE. L. J. 1934, 1953-73 (2015) (discussing how
municipalities use the built environment—sidewalks, dead end streets, location of bridge entrances,
medians, etc.—to create physical barriers that exclude low income people and people of color); see also
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, at XVII.
87. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 85, at 203 (stating that integration of neighborhoods should be
incentivized because segregated neighborhoods disadvantage all communities).
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chance to take on this task. As such, managed retreat presents the dual opportunity
to not only move communities away from vulnerable coastal areas but also to right
some of the wrongs that continue to haunt the United States. 88
Managed retreat is the movement of “people and assets away from risk . . . in a
preplanned, coordinated way.”89 While the word “retreat” carries with it a
connotation of failure, managed retreat “is not a goal in and of itself but a means of
contributing to societal goals.”90 Thus, managed retreat from the threat of rising sea
levels is more accurately a “set of tools” or methods that can be used to “strengthen
[the coastline’s] natural resources while assuring the recovery and long-term safety
of its inhabitants.”91 These managed retreat “tools” range from development
planning, flood insurance reform, zoning overlays, setbacks, building and rebuilding
restrictions, building moratoria, condemnation, and buyouts, among others. 92 Each
tool promotes movement away from the coast either all at once or gradually. 93
While there are innumerable ways to incentivize movement away from
coastlines, this Comment considers two managed retreat tools in particular: (1) the
use of eminent domain by local and state governments, and (2) the enactment of
ordinances known as “rebuilding restrictions” that prohibit or restrict rebuilding once
a structure has been destroyed by rising sea levels or an extreme sea level event.
These two managed retreat tools provide a useful lens through which to view and
strategize around some of the Takings Clause issues that may arise in the
implementation of managed retreat.
First, eminent domain, as a legally straightforward method of retreat, 94
highlights some of the broader social and political considerations that must be taken
into account in deciding how and when to retreat from vulnerable areas.
Furthermore, eminent domain, as an extreme option, provides a foil to other managed
retreat tools that can be useful in deciding how to implement managed retreat.
Second, rebuilding restrictions are a perfect vehicle for exploring the property
implications of managed retreat because the exact legal consequence of a rebuilding
restriction is unclear. This managed retreat tool is a useful context for exploring the
various ways in which a court would apply takings jurisprudence in the novel context
88. See id. at XI (“By failing to recognize that we now live with the severe, enduring effects of de
jure segregation, we avoid confronting our own constitutional obligation to reverse it.”).
89. Sophia Schmidt, Considering ‘Managed Retreat’ as a Response to Sea Level Rise, DEL. PUB.
MEDIA (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.delawarepublic.org/post/considering-managed-retreat-response-sealevel-rise [https://perma.cc/QA2C-9P6K]; see Gibson, supra note 79.
90. A.R. Siders et al., supra note 81; see also Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning,
and Vulnerable Populations at the Urban Periphery: Imaging a Resilient New York After Superstorm
Sandy, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 37 (2014) (explaining that in its climate planning, New York City “slipped
into the colloquial use of the term ‘retreat’ as a surrendering to climate change and abandonment of the
coastline, which runs the risk of overwhelming the world’s more specific meaning as an urban land use
policy and strategy for responding to climate change”).
91. Liz Koslov, The Case for Retreat, 28 PUB. CULTURE 259, 361 (2016). See generally ANNE
SIDERS, COLUM. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK
ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS 5-7 (2013).
92. See SIDERS, supra note 91, at 5-7 (providing an overview of potential managed retreat policies
and tools that can be implemented to incentivize movement away from coastlines).
93. See id.
94. See Hyo Kim & Caroline A. Karp, When Retreat is the Better Part of Valor: A Legal Analysis
of Strategies to Motivate Retreat from the Shore, 5 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 169, 189 (2012).
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of sea level rise. Moreover, building restrictions demonstrate the inherent push and
pull between private property rights and public welfare, providing an avenue through
which to explore broader social issues present at the intersection of the environment
and property.
In the last decade, legal scholarship on climate change has exploded, likely
correlated with a general increase in societal awareness, acceptance, and escalating
urgency. While many legal scholars have examined facets of the intersection of
rising sea levels and property rights, there has been no research specifically on its
impact in Maine. Furthermore, the majority of these articles, provide a broad
overview of different managed retreat options, rather than engaging in an in-depth
analysis of just a few.95
This Comment adds to this body of research by providing an in-depth look at
the takings implications of two specific managed retreat tools in the context of
Maine. This focus on Maine acknowledges that climate impacts are highly sitespecific. While eminent domain may be the most straightforward managed retreat
tool, local governments should instead implement rebuilding restrictions because
they are less likely to be “takings” under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, when
paired with a social safety net financial program, rebuilding restrictions present a
unique opportunity to redistribute wealth, desegregate our communities, and undo
some of the harmful social policies that have become physically ingrained in the
layout of our communities.
1. Governmental Authority to Implement and Incentivize Managed Retreat
As a threshold matter, it is vital to consider not only who will be implementing
these managed retreat tools but also whether that entity has the authority to do so.
While the federal government could initiate managed retreat from coastal areas
utilizing its Commerce Clause power, 96 state and local governments are the more
likely implementers of managed retreat. For political reasons, the federal
government may be unwilling to take action. Additionally, sea level rise impacts are

95. See, e.g., Jeremy Patashnik, The Trolley Problem of Climate Change: Should Governments
Face Takings Liability if Adaptive Strategies Cause Property Damage, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1273
(2019) (addressing whether the government should face takings liability if strategies for mitigating sea
level rise causes damage to others); Gary Dreyzin, The Next Wage of Climate Change Litigation:
Comparing Constitutional Inverse Condemnation Claims in the United States, South Africa, and Japan,
31 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 183 (2018) (analyzing the climate change impacts of inverse condemnation
claims across different countries); John Lovett, Moving to Higher Ground: Protecting and Relocating
Communities in Response to Climate Change, 42 VT. L. REV. 25 (2017) (analyzing whether property
owners can bring a claim for governmental failure to protect against sea level rise); Craig, supra note
36, at 103 (arguing that governments should frame their climate change intervention strategies in terms
of public health); Michael Allen Wolf, Strategies for Making Sea-Level Rise Adaptation Tools ‘TakingsProof,’ 28 J. LAND USE 157 (2013) (providing an overview of different sea level rise adaptation
methods and their subsequent risks); Kim & Karp, supra note 94 (analyzing the legal implications of
mandatory setbacks, coastal armoring, cluster zoning, and mandated flood insurance).
96. See Kim & Karp, supra note 94, at 179 (explaining that, through the Commerce Clause power,
the federal government has the authority to regulate all navigable waters and channels of commerce. In
combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress is able to “enact most of the nation’s
public health-related, environmental laws . . . [which] will continue to affect development in coastal and
riparian floodplains.”).
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localized in nature, and, as such, local governments have a better understanding of
the needs, concerns, and barriers at play in a particular locale.
a. State Authority to Implement Managed Retreat
The state of Maine--and all other states implementing managed retreat—has
ample authority to do so. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that all “powers not delegated to the United States [i.e., federal government] by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”97 Subject to constitutional restraints incorporated against the
States, such as the Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses, states remain
free to “establish and enforce laws protecting the public’s health, safety, and general
welfare, or to delegate this right to local governments.”98 Beyond these general
police powers, Maine statutory provisions such as the Natural Resources Protection
Act,99 Coastal Zone Management Act,100 and Mandatory Shoreline Zoning Act 101
have all articulated the state’s authority to regulate coastal areas, plan for
development, and protect natural resources.
b. Local Authority to Implement Managed Retreat
While states may articulate broad overarching policy goals or minimum
requirements for the preservation of shorelines and management of development,
local governments are often in charge of implementing these land use directives
pursuant to their home rule authority. 102 In 1969, Maine amended its constitution to
grant municipalities home rule authority, which was subsequently codified by the
legislature.103 Maine courts have treated this successive codification as being
broader than the Maine Constitution, allowing local governments the wide latitude
to enact ordinances that address issues beyond those that are “local and municipal in
character.”104 Given the broad authority of municipal governments to pass laws that
further the police powers, as delegated by the state, there is little question that local
governments would be able to enact ordinances in furtherance of managed retreat.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
98. Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
99. See 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-A (Supp. 2020).
100. See 38 M.R.S.A. § 1801 (1985).
101. See 38 M.R.S.A. § 435 (2013).
102. See Kim & Karp, supra note 94, at 181.
103. See ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1; 30-A M.R.S.A § 2101 (1987); see also Ordinances &
Home Rule, ME. MUN. ASS’N., https://www.memun.org/Training-Resources/LocalGovernment/Ordinances-Home-Rule [https://perma.cc/6SCT-U2Q3] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
104. School Comm. of York v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 938-39 (Me. 1993). Compare ME.
CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1 (“The inhabitants of any municipality shall have the power to alter and
amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or general law, which are local and
municipal in character. The Legislature shall prescribe the procedure by which the municipality may so
act.”), with 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001(1) (1987) (“Any municipality, by the adoption, amendment or repeal
of ordinances or bylaws, may exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power to confer
upon it, which is not denied either expressly or by clear implication, and exercise any power or function
granted to the municipality by the Constitution of Maine, general law or charter. . . . This section, being
necessary for the welfare of the municipalities and their inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect
its purpose.”).
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II. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The government’s authority to use its police powers to protect the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens comes head-to-head with private
property rights. The importance of private property protections is engrained in our
cultural values and our state and federal constitutions through the adoption of
Takings Clauses.105 As such, the primary nexus of the law and managed retreat is
likely to be in the form of takings claims brought by property owners and developers.
A. The Federal Takings Clause
The U.S. Constitution provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for
public use, without just compensation.” 106 There are two categories of takings: (1)
physical takings, where the government takes possession of the land itself, usually
through eminent domain, and (2) regulatory takings, where the government enacts a
regulation that affects private property.107 While historically created to address
physical appropriation of private property by the government, 108 the majority of
modern takings litigation centers on regulatory takings. 109 Thus, the majority of
contemporary takings litigation examines whether a regulation impacts private
property to such an extent that it is functionally equivalent to a physical taking and
should be subject to the same standard of just compensation.110
Within its regulatory takings jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court further
divides regulatory takings cases into two broad categories: (1) cases that are subject
to the Court’s per se takings rules, and (2) cases that are subject to an ad hoc
balancing test.111 The per se rules apply where the government regulation either
authorizes a permanent physical invasion of property by a third party112 or where the
regulation deprives the property owner of “all economically beneficial use[ ] of the
property.”113 If neither of these categorical rules apply, the court engages in a factspecific, ad hoc inquiry to determine whether the regulation nonetheless authorizes
a taking.114

105. See generally Calabresi et al., supra note 6 (providing an overview of adoption of takings
clauses in state constitutions).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (eminent domain); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (regulatory taking).
108. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 785-92 (1995) (explaining the historical development of the Takings
Clause).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (stating that the central
“touchstone” of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence is “identify[ing] regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain”).
111. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (per se
taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (per se taking); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (ad hoc balancing test).
112. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
113. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
114. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
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B. The Maine Takings Clause
In comparison, the takings provision of the Maine Constitution states that
“[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation, nor
unless the public exigencies require it.”115 While Maine has not developed a
substantially robust takings jurisprudence, the Law Court 116 has stated that “[its]
analysis and conclusion are the same under both [the Maine and U.S.]
Constitutions.”117
The majority of regulatory takings cases in Maine (at least as decided by the
Law Court) date back to the 1970s and 1980s, with the most recent major case
decided in 2001.118 In Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation
Commission, the Law Court established the current takings standard, stating that
property is “taken” when the extinguishment of a “‘fundamental attribute of
ownership’ . . . would render the property substantially useless.” 119 In determining
whether a regulation exacts a taking, the court must “determine the value of the
property at the time of the governmental restriction and compare that with its value
afterward, to determine whether the diminution, if any, is so substantial as to strip
the property of all practical value.”120 The Law Court has labeled this a “categorical
rule,”121 and subsequent case law has treated this test as comparable to the per se rule
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.122
Thus, because the courts have interpreted the Maine takings provision as having
the same scope, and equivalent analysis as the U.S. Constitution, federal takings case
law may provide guidance in considering a takings issue in Maine. 123 The Law Court
and trial courts have consistently cited to federal takings jurisprudence in developing

115. ME. CONST. art. I, § 21. In the regulatory takings context, Maine’s takings standard tracks the
federal standard. In the eminent domain context, Maine requires the additional element of public
exigency. See id.
116. Maine’s highest court, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, is referred to as the “Law Court”
when deciding cases in its appellate capacity. See Supreme Court, State of Maine Judicial Branch,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/PYB6-PYAN] (last
visited Oct. 29, 2020).
117. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 177 (Me. 1989); see also MC Assocs. v. Town of Cape
Elizabeth, 2001 ME 89, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 439 (stating that an analysis of whether property has lost all
beneficial or productive use is the same under both the Maine and U.S. Constitutions).
118. See, e.g., MC Assocs., 2001 ME 89, 773 A.2d 439; Seven Islands Land Co. v. Me. Land Use
Regul. Comm’n, 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); see also
Michael A. Duddy, Taking it Too Far: Growth Management and the Limits of Land-Use Regulation in
Maine, 44 ME. L. REV. 99 (1992) (tracing the development of Maine’s takings clause).
119. Seven Islands Land Co., 450 A.2d at 482 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980)).
120. Id.
121. See MC Assocs., 2001 ME 89, ¶ 11, 773 A.2d 439.
122. See, e.g., id. (citing to both Lucas and Maine takings precedent in articulating Maine’s
categorical takings standard); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
123. See Madden v. Inhabitants of Frankfort, No. AP2012001, 2012 WL 9189533, at *5 n.3 (Me.
Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012) (“The scope of the takings clause of the Maine Constitution has generally
been interpreted as coextensive with the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution, so that state courts may
properly consider federal case law when applying the Maine Constitution.”); Fichter v. Bd. of Env’t
Prot., No. CV-90-624, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *10 (Jan. 9, 1997) (“[T]o the extent that [federal
caselaw] has modified or shed light on Fifth Amendment takings law, it has also modified or shed light
on the state constitutional provision.”).
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and applying the current Maine standard.124 Given that the courts have interpreted
the Maine takings provision as being coterminous with the federal Takings Clause,
the Law Court is likely to turn to federal case law for guidance in analyzing takings
issues that arise as a result of climate change and sea level rise.125 As such, this
Comment will analyze federal case law where the Maine courts have not spoken.
C. Takings Jurisprudence and Cultural Views of Property
The inclusion of private property protections within the Maine and U.S.
Constitutions recognizes the right to exclude others from private property as a
fundamental American value.126 However, the government’s ability to take private
property “for public use” nevertheless demonstrates that, while protecting private
property is of paramount importance, it must be weighed against the public good.127
In some situations, the broader societal benefit achieved by taking private property
far outstrips the impact on the private property owner. 128 However, the Supreme
Court has stated that the purpose of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment is
to prevent the “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”129 Thus,
124. See MC Assocs., 2001 ME 89, ¶¶ 4-6, 11, 773 A.2d 439 (citing to Mahon, Penn Central, and
Lucas with approval); Seven Islands Land Co., 450 A.2d at 482 (citing to Penn Central in discussing the
ad hoc takings analysis and “property as a whole” against which diminution in value is measured);
Madden, 2012 WL 9189533, at *5 (citing to Loretto, Lucas, Penn Central, and Lingle in discussing the
scope of the Maine takings provision in relation to the federal standards); Wyer v. Bd. of Env’t Prot.,
No. CV-92-1091, 1998 Me. Super. LEXIS 96, at *8 (Apr. 14, 1998), aff’d, 2000 ME 45, 747 A.2d 192
(citing to the Penn Central factors); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superintendent, No. CV-89-963, 1991 Me. Super.
LEXIS 5, at *22-29 (Jan. 2, 1991) (analyzing Penn Central in the context of a confiscatory insurance
rate).
125. While it is likely that the Law Court will use federal case law as guidance when interpreting
Maine’s takings clause, the importance of takings law in Maine’s climate change battle may prompt a
divergence at some point.
126. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude other from enjoying it.”).
Takings jurisprudence reflects the tension between two schools of property theory: traditional law and
economics theory, and progressive property theory. Law and economic theory focuses on the efficient
use of property through privatization, which internalizes the externalities thereby maximizing the
efficient use of property. See Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive Property Theory and Housing Justice
Campaigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 251, 256 (2019); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967). Progressive property theorists argue that there are certain
social obligations inherent in owning private property because ownership of property by one person
naturally means that others are excluded from and denied that property. See Weiss, supra, at 257;
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Progressive Property Moving Forward, 5 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 349, 360 (2014);
Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743
(2009); Laura S. Underkuffler, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1996)
(“If the enjoyment of a particular good by one person is protected, then the enjoyment of that same good
by others is denied. The extension of property protection to one person necessarily and inevitably
denies the same right to others.”). Progressive property theorists argue the importance of integrating
transparency, humility, and group identity into property decisions. See Mulvaney, supra, at 358-369.
127. Micah Elazar, “Public Use” and the Justification of Takings, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 249, 252
(2004).
128. See id. at 249.
129. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
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any takings analysis must consider these background concepts of social
responsibility, and who bears the cost.
The most clear-cut example of the use of the Takings Clause is eminent domain,
whereby the government physically takes private property for a public purpose. 130
What is significantly less clear cut is whether a governmental regulation, which may
affect the rights of a property owner—but where the government has not physically
taken possession of the property—is nevertheless considered a taking under the Fifth
Amendment (or the Maine Constitution). While the U.S. Supreme Court has created
several categorical rules131 to determine when governmental action constitutes a
taking, the majority of takings disputes fall somewhere along a spectrum. As Figure
1 demonstrates, there is no exact point at which an unconstitutional taking has
occurred.132 A Maine Superior Court judge described the Takings Clause in this
way:
In land use “regulatory takings” law . . . there is a continuum along which the
exercise of police powers at one point may simply implicate due process deprivation
of property concerns but another point may be so onerous as to implicate the takings
clause. The exact point at which a regulation becomes so onerous, or goes “too far,”
has never been precisely delineated by the Supreme Court and, in fact, has been
recognized as impossible to locate except on an ad hoc basis. “There is no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.”133

As seen in Figure 1, the different managed retreat tools align along the Takings
Clause continuum, with eminent domain on one side (a taking that requires just
compensation) and setbacks on the other end of the spectrum (not a taking). 134 While
it is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment at which a regulation becomes a
taking,135 sea level rise complicates the takings analysis by raising complex questions
of governmental responsibility, and which members of society should bear the cost
of protecting coastal areas. While larger societal values136 are embedded in all

130. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that a
permanent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (stating that a regulation exacts a taking if it completely wipes out
the value of the property).
132. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superintendent, No. CV-89-964, 1991 Me. Super. LEXIS 5, at *19 (Jan. 2,
1991).
133. Id. (quoting Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962)). This case did not
apply a takings analysis in the context of land use. However, Justice Perkins nonetheless provides a
useful discussion of the theoretical background underpinning the takings analysis.
134. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002)
(stating that setback ordinances are not regulatory takings because they only place restrictions on a
limited portion of a piece of property).
135. Some states have attempted to numerically quantify the point at which a taking occurs by
passing legislation that states that a taking occurs if property is reduced in value by a specific
percentage. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(h) (1995) (40% reduction in fair market value); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (West 1997) (25% reduction in fair market value).
136. See e.g., Marshall B. Knapp, Social Values and Older Persons: The Role of the Law, 7 MARQ.
ELDER’S ADVISOR 69, 72 (2005) (“[T]he law reflects and embodies prevailing social attitudes by
codifying and enshrining them with a formal, official, and enforceable status.”); Underkuffler, supra
note 126, at 1046 (“Property rights are, by nature social rights; they embody how we, as a society, have
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takings jurisprudence, even if only implicitly, rising sea levels throw many of these
considerations into a new light. As a result, the catastrophic effects of climate change
may force courts to re-think how takings claims should be resolved in light of new
and pressing threats to society that will be ubiquitous in coastal communities.
Figure 1. The Takings Clause Continuum

III. MANAGED RETREAT TOOL #1: EMINENT DOMAIN
The first managed retreat tool that state and local governments could use to
move people away from high-risk coastal areas is eminent domain. Eminent domain
is the most extreme method of managed retreat as the government physically takes
possession of the property at issue, thereby engaging in a complete taking that is
subject to just compensation under the state and federal Takings Clauses. When the
government utilizes eminent domain, the government must pay just compensation
equal to fair market value of the property before condemnation occurred.137 Because
the government takes physical possession of the private property through the use of
eminent domain, this managed retreat tool is relatively straightforward and
uncomplicated with respect to where it falls on the takings continuum 138 However,
even if the government is willing to pay just compensation, the question remains
whether the taking is for a “public use.” 139
In interpreting the Maine Constitution and state statutes, the Law Court has
stated that for the state or a local government to exercise the power of eminent
domain the following two elements must be met: (1) the property must be for public
use, and (2) the use of eminent domain must be in response to public exigencies. 140
A public exigency requires the court to find the following: that “the taking was
necessary, and the property interest was taken only to the extent necessary; and the
property is suitable for the particular public use for which it was taken.” 141 With
chosen to reward the claims of some people to finite and critical goods, and to deny the claims to some
goods by others.”).
137. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 394 (2015) (“The Court has repeatedly held that just
compensation normally is measured by the market value of the property at the time of the taking.”)
(quoting United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984)).
138. See Wolf, supra note 95, at 164; see infra Figure 1 (providing a visual representation of the
takings continuum).
139. See id.
140. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 21.
141. Bayberry Cove Child.’s Land Trust v. Town of Steuben, 2018 ME 28, ¶ 9, 180 A.3d 119
(quoting Portland Co. v. City of Portland, 2009 ME 98, ¶ 25, 979 A.2d 1279).
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respect to public exigency, the Law Court gives a great deal of deference to the
municipality, looking only to see whether the taking “was made in bad faith or
through an abuse of power.”142 Because courts give substantial deference to
municipalities in determining whether there was public exigency, there is little to no
precedent from Maine courts analyzing this factor. Therefore, this Comment focuses
solely on the issue of “public use.”
A. Preservation of Coastal Ecology is a “Public Use” Justifying Eminent Domain
The central question in using eminent domain to facilitate managed retreat is
whether the condemnation of private property to protect people from rising sea levels
and facilitate managed retreat qualifies as a “public use.” Scholars generally agree
that there are few legal barriers to governments using eminent domain as a managed
retreat tool, 143 especially if couched in terms of ecological preservation, which courts
have consistently held to be a “public use.” 144 Ultimately, courts are likely to hold
that under both the U.S. and Maine Constitutions, condemning property for
ecological preservation and creating a protective barrier against sea level rise is a
“public use.” However, this issue is likely a closer call under Maine law due to
additional statutory restrictions on the use of eminent domain that go beyond the
state constitution.
1. Public Use: Federal Caselaw
Since the late 1800s, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “public
use” as being equivalent with “public purpose”145 and has demonstrated nearly
unrestricted deference to Congress and state legislatures in determining whether the
condemnation of land is for a “public use.” 146 In Kelo v. City of New London, the

142. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 19, 951 A.2d 821) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Portland Co., 2009 ME 98, ¶ 25, 979 A.2d 1279 (“[I]n an eminent
domain action, a property owner has no constitutional right to have the question of public exigency
judicially reviewed, except to determine whether the government acted in bad faith or abused its
power.”).
143. See Lovett, supra note 95, at 31; Kim & Karp, supra note 94.
144. See, e.g., United States v. 480 Acres of Land, 557 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing
the use of eminent domain in expanding Everglades National Park); United States v. Eighty Acres of
Land, 26 F. Supp. 315, 320 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (discussing the use of eminent domain in the condemnation
of property for the purpose of preserving forestland); Steven A. Hemmat, Parks, People, and Private
Property: The National Park Service and Eminent Domain, 16 ENV’T L. 935, 936-38 (1986) (explaining
the use of eminent domain in obtaining land for conservation by the National Park Service); History of
the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd
/history-federal-use-eminent-domain [https://perma.cc/9U8J-PF3B] (explaining the federal
government’s history of using eminent domain for historic preservation and environmental
conservation).
145. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
146. See id. at 483 (“[The City’s] determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a
program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.”); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[T]he Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a
legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“[W]hen
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
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Supreme Court held that economic development was a “public use.” 147 Not only had
the state legislature determined that condemnation of the property was necessary for
the economic revitalization of the area and was, therefore, a “public use,” but
promoting economic development was deemed a “traditional and long-accepted
function of government.” 148 The Kelo holding and deference to the legislature had
the practical effect of allowing nearly any legislative determination of “public use”
to be a permissible justification for condemning private property.149
The Supreme Court’s deference in Kelo to the state legislature’s determination
of whether economic development was a “public use” was not a departure from
precedent. Before Kelo, the Court consistently upheld legislative determinations of
“public use” in situations that did not fall squarely into traditional conceptions of
“public use.” For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the government
upheld the condemnation of land to break up an oligopoly as a “public use.”150 In
Berman v. Parker, the condemnation of property under a slum clearance statute was
a “public use.” 151 These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has consistently
equated “public use” under eminent domain power with the state’s police power to
protect “public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order.” 152
2. Public Use: Maine Caselaw and Statutes
While the Law Court has taken a relatively permissive view 153 of what
constitutes a “public use,” the Law Court’s interpretation is not as broad as that of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Maine courts have held that property is “devoted to a public
use only when the general public, or some portion of it (as opposed to particular
individuals), in its organized capacity and upon occasion to do so, has the right to
demand and share in its use.”154 At the time the property is condemned, the land
cannot be only theoretically taken for public use but must be taken for public use “in
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social
legislation . . . .”).
147. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-88.
148. Id. at 484.
149. See id. at 488-89; Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper
Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 45, 55 (2008).
150. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-44.
151. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-36.
152. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501-502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-33; see also
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (“The ‘public use’ requirement is [] coterminous with the scope of the
sovereign’s police power.”).
153. The current standard for eminent domain in Maine is significantly more relaxed compared to
the standard applied in the late 1800s, which was highly protective of private property rights. See
Bangor & P.R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290, 295 (1872) (“This exercise of the right of eminent domain
is, in its nature, in derogation of the great and fundamental principle of all constitutional governments,
which secures to every individual the right to acquire, possess and defend property. As between
individuals, no necessity, however great, no exigency, however imminent, no improvement, however
valuable, no refusal, however unneighborly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable, no offers of
compensation, however extravagant, can compel or require any man to part with an inch of his estate.
The constitution protects him and his possession, when held on, even to the extent of churlish
obstinacy.”).
154. Bayberry Cove Child.’s Land Tr. v. Town of Steuben, 2018 ME 28, ¶ 18, 180 A.3d 119
(quoting Blanchard v. Dep’t of Transp., 2002 ME 96, ¶ 29, 789 A.2d 1119).
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actuality, practicality and effectiveness.” 155
Furthermore, the codification of eminent domain under Maine statutory law,
which authorizes municipalities to acquire real estate for public uses, reflects general
skepticism towards a broad interpretation of “public use.”156 For example, the Maine
Legislature limited the scope of the eminent domain authority, preventing the State
or a local government from condemning land used for “agricultural, fishing or
forestry or land improved with residential homes, commercial or industrial business
or other structures[] [f]or . . . private retail, office, commercial, industrial or
residential development,” to improve tax revenue, or for the purpose of transferring
a business entity.157 While the Legislature narrowed the scope of the State’s eminent
domain power, it also created an exception to this limitation—permitting
municipalities to use eminent domain to eliminate blight pursuant to a redevelopment
or urban renewal plan. 158 While Maine’s eminent domain framework is narrower
than that of the federal courts, it may not, in actuality, prevent the State or local
government from using eminent domain to incentivize managed retreat. 159
3. Ecological Preservation as Public Use
While it is unclear exactly how courts would apply eminent domain in the
context of rising sea levels, there is a strong case to be made for framing the
preservation of coastal ecology to mitigate sea level rise impacts as a “public use.”
Science tells us that marsh systems need room to expand and adapt. 160 The
condemnation of private property for this use, therefore, serves the public by creating
an adaptable buffer zone to help protect against rising sea levels. Moreover, courts
have held that preservation and acquisition of ecologically significant areas is a
legitimate public use that allows state, local, and federal governments to use eminent
domain power as long as the property owner receives just compensation. 161

155. Id.
156. See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3101 (2020); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”).
Maine was one of many states that passed legislation in the wake of Kelo over concerns that the
Supreme Court had defined “public use” so broadly that it would result in the erosion of private property
rights. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2108-14 (2009).
157. 1 M.R.S.A. § 816(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
158. 1 M.R.S.A. § 816(2) (2006); see also Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 218-38, 107
A.2d 841, 843-53 (1954).
159. See Somin, supra note 156, at 2115-17, 2126-27 (stating that Maine’s Post-Kelo statutory
reforms are ineffective and do not actually narrow the scope of the eminent domain power).
160. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Union Cnty. 16.29 Acres of Land, 35 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776-77 (D. Or.
1997) (stating that “[w]etlands mitigation is a proper public use”); United States v. Eighty Acres of
Land in Williamson Cnty., 26 F. Supp. 315, 320 (E.D. Ill. 1939) (stating that the condemnation of
property in order to protect forestland is a public purpose because “flood control and the prevention of
soil erosion are matters of public interest, national in scope . . . [as] demonstrated through disasters
affecting the whole nation”); Golden Gate Bridge Highway & Transp. Dist. v. Muzzi, 83 Cal. App. 3d
707, 713 (1978) (holding that condemning private property for the purpose of protecting marshlands is a
permissible means of mitigating environmental harm).
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B. Eminent Domain Should Not Be Used as the Primary Tool for Managed Retreat
While there may be no legal barriers to using eminent domain, there may be
significant political, social, and cultural barriers that not only make eminent domain
an untenable managed retreat tool but also a potentially harmful one.
1. Eminent Domain is Politically Fraught and Economically Inefficient
Eminent domain is an unrealistic option, first and foremost, because it is a
contentious political issue. While homeowners are entitled to just compensation
when the government condemns property, homeowners may have subjective
attachments to that property that no amount of money can compensate. 162
Furthermore, eminent domain creates “dignitary harms,” or a sense of outrage and
feeling of being targeted by the government that can create ripples of anxiety within
a community as people wonder if the government will take their property next.163
The intense emotional attachments to property and the likelihood of backlash mean
that few, if any, government officials are likely to endorse eminent domain as a
politically viable managed retreat option.164
Lack of political will is also closely linked to concerns over the cost of using
eminent domain for managed retreat. Eminent domain would require the allocation
of a significant amount of tax dollars to condemn the most at-risk properties—coastal
properties in Maine are expensive.165 Furthermore, municipalities may be concerned
that condemning land will reduce the government’s tax base. 166 While this may be
true in the short term, concerns about a diminished tax base fail to account for the
fact that moving people away from vulnerable areas will ultimately reduce the tax
dollars used to mitigate flood and storm damage in the long term. 167
2. The Fine Line Between “Public Use” and Abuse
While governments may reject eminent domain as a managed retreat option
because of economic and political infeasibility, that may not be such a bad thing.
162. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property
Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD., 713, 720-21
(2008).
163. Id. at 721-22.
164. Imperial Beach, California is a good example of how politically fraught discussions of managed
retreat and eminent domain can become. A good portion of the town is located in low-lying coastal
areas and is extremely at risk of rising sea levels. See Marty Graham, IB Tries to Calm Fears of
Eminent Domain, SAN DIEGO READER (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2018
/nov/16/stringers-ib-tries-calm-fears-eminent-domain/ [https://perma.cc/4R27-KW3Z].
165. The median sale price for waterfront property in Maine in 2019 was $275,000. Maine Real
Estate Report, MAINE HOME CONNECTION, https://www.mainehomeconnection.com/MarketValues
[https://perma.cc/B9PS-QX94] (last visited Nov. 10, 2020); see also Wanda Curtis, Southern Maine
Real Estate Market Heating Up, ISLAND INST. (Jan. 31, 2019), http://www.islandinstitute.org/workingwaterfront/southern-maine-real-estate-market-heating [https://perma.cc/E343-ZWTF] (stating that the
average listing prices of homes in the coastal towns of South Portland, York, and Portland were
$325,000, $344,000, and $425,000, respectively).
166. See Koslov, supra note 91, at 363.
167. See id.; see also McArdle, supra note 80, at 623-25 (explaining that while there may be
concerns about lost tax revenue, limiting re-development of coastal property can avert costs through the
restoration of coastal ecosystems).
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Historically, eminent domain has disproportionately targeted the indigent, minority
populations, and other marginalized communities. 168 Typically, eminent domain has
been used to condemn property owned by minority populations in low-income areas
as part of urban renewal projects that were overtly racist in their objectives. 169 These
projects often benefited the wealthy at the expense of those who were displaced. 170
For example, the use of eminent domain in Berman v. Parker was primarily targeted
at people of color, as ninety-seven percent of the people who were displaced by the
redevelopment project were Black.171 Research shows that marginalized populations
bear the brunt of eminent domain because they are politically isolated and easily
targeted by local governments since they do not have the resources or political capital
to fight against the use of eminent domain. 172 Thus, even though “just
compensation” is intended to ensure that burdens are borne equitably across the
entire population,173 governments disproportionately use eminent domain against
vulnerable and minority communities.174
The use of eminent domain as a managed retreat tool poses the risk that
economic and socially marginalized populations will be the first to bear the costs of
rising sea levels. Maine is particularly unique in that along its 3,478 miles of
coastline live some of Maine’s wealthiest residents and some of its poorest. 175 The
lack of socioeconomic uniformity of Mainers residing on the coast means that needs,

168. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating
that those most likely to benefit from eminent domain are those with political power and influence while
those most likely to suffer are those who have few resources); see also Brief of National Association for
Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057, at *3 (arguing that eminent domain for
the purposes of economic development “disproportionately harm[s] racial and ethnic minorities, the
elderly, and the economically underprivileged”); Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal
Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI.
171, 177 (2016) (stating that urban renewal projects like those in Berman v. Parker had severe, negative
economic, social, emotional, cultural, and political consequences on people who were displaced); Carol
Necole Brown, Justice Thomas’s Kelo Dissent: The Perilous and Political Nature of Public Purpose 23
GEO. MASON L. REV. 273, 275 (2016); DICK M. CARPENTER II & JOHN K. ROSS, INST. FOR JUST.,
VICTIMIZING THE VULNERABLE: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 1-2 (June 2007).
169. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting); Justin B. Kamen, A Standardless
Standard: How a Misapplication of Kelo Enabled Columbia University to Benefit from Eminent Domain
Abuse, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1217, 1221-22 (2012) (discussing the ways in which eminent domain tends
to favor wealthy communities with political power).
170. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
171. See id.
172. Catherine E. Beideman, Eminent Domain and Environmental Justice: A New Standard of
Review in Discrimination Cases, 34 B.C. ENV’T AFF. L. REV. 273, 291 (2007).
173. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
174. Andrea J. Boyack, Side by Side: Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring Residential Diversity,
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 459-60 (2017) (stating that “twentieth century urban renewal via eminent
domain decimated minority communities and failed to achieve sustainable city growth”); Beideman,
supra note 172, at 292-93, 295.
175. See Island Inst., supra note 43, at 2-3 (2020) (explaining that ten coastal communities in
Southern Maine have the highest median income in Maine, while five coastal communities in Downeast
Maine have the lowest median income in Maine).
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political engagement, and power vary significantly. 176 This difference creates a risk
of abuse if vulnerable individuals who have less political power are the first to bear
the consequences of eminent domain.177
As a result of this risk, any managed retreat tool, but in particular, eminent
domain, will require that implementation occur through an environmental justice 178
framework.179 Doing so will ensure that all individuals have equal access to, and
involvement in, the decision-making process. All members of society, not just the
most politically connected, should be protected and taken into account. While there
is a significant risk inherent in all managed retreat, especially eminent domain,
moving people away from the coastline creates an opportunity to plan for better
functioning and more sustainable communities.
3. Maine’s Coastline is Not Well Suited to Eminent Domain
While eminent domain may be both politically infeasible and can lead to abuse
of vulnerable populations, eminent domain also presents the unique difficulty of
deciding which property the government should take and when to do so. While sea
level rise is inevitable, it is not necessarily uniform across all locations. 180 Scientific
projections can predict that rising sea levels will inundate a particular piece of
property, but localized factors such as subsidence, runoff, and currents make it
impossible to predict whether inundation will occur next year or in ten years, for
example.181 As a result, using eminent domain runs the risk that the government will
condemn property—believing that it is at high risk now—when it will not likely
experience any flooding for several years.
One of the primary justifications for using eminent domain is that it would
reduce governmental costs of both responding to natural disasters, and rebuilding
roads and bridges after-the-fact. However, this justification does not apply equally
176. See generally Sunmin Kim, Rethinking Models of Minority Political Participation: Inter- and
Intra-group Variation in Political “Styles,” 16 DU BOIS REV. 489 (2019) (discussing the relationship
between socioeconomic status and political participation among different racial groups); Henry E.
Brady, et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271
(1995) (analyzing the impact of time, money, and civic skills on political participation). Additionally, it
is commonly recognized in Maine that many wealthy coastal residents are not economically tied to
living on the coast, compared to poorer coastal communities whose livelihoods may be based in the
fishing or lobstering industry.
177. CARPENTER & ROSS, supra note 168, at 7.
178. “Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation,
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.” EPA, Environmental Justice,
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice [https://perma.cc/AL2M-GLQY] (last visited Oct. 29, 2020).
While environmental justice has in the past primarily focused on the concentration of environmental
hazards near low-income and vulnerable populations, it is nonetheless applicable in the context of
eminent domain, which shares many similarities to exposure to environmental hazards in terms of
forcing vulnerable populations to shoulder the effects of certain initiatives. See Beideman, supra note
172, at 293, 290-91. But see Keene, supra note 81, at 141-42 (discussing how “vulnerability” can be
defined in ways that still exclude certain populations, even when applying a climate justice framework).
179. See Beideman, supra note 172, at 290-91 (discussing the intersection of eminent domain and
environmental justice).
180. See IPCC Report 2019, supra note 11, at 55-57.
181. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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to all coastal property in Maine. For instance, someone living on an island in the
Gulf of Maine who is completely off-the-grid and relies on a septic system, a well,
and solar panels may be very vulnerable, but does not require the same governmental
resources and infrastructure. In this situation, the justification for using eminent
domain to reduce government expenditures when responding to an emergency and
fixing infrastructure is not as strong. As a result, there is not always a match between
the most vulnerable areas and the governmental upkeep of vital infrastructure, further
complicating the process of choosing which properties to condemn. Ultimately,
eminent domain should only be used on a selective basis rather than as a primary,
widespread means of facilitating retreat.
4. Compensation Based on Fair Market Value of Property is Harmful in the
Climate Change Context
Finally, one of the primary concerns with eminent domain is that the government
always has to pay just compensation for the property that has been taken, based on
fair market value of the property. Under a compensation scheme that is based on fair
market value, the rich receive enormously high compensation, while the poor receive
little in comparison.182 Eminent domain, therefore, perpetuates the same extreme
wealth differentials that presently exist. Furthermore, when property is taken by
eminent domain just compensation is given to the property owner. If the owner has
rented the property, the tenant receives nothing in the way of just compensation, even
though she is losing her home. 183
In comparison, other managed retreat tools that do not mandate just
compensation avoid this fair market value problem. If the government does not have
to pay just compensation under the Takings Clause, the government could develop a
compensation scheme that is more appropriate for the unique impacts of rising sea
levels and the large number of people who will need to move. Eminent domain
therefore entrenches, and potentially worsens, our current status quo. As such, other
techniques are better suited to more equitably facilitate managed retreat than eminent
domain.
IV. MANAGED RETREAT #2: REBUILDING RESTRICTIONS
An alternative tool that encourages managed retreat, but also avoids many of the
concerns raised by eminent domain, are rebuilding restrictions. A rebuilding
182. See David Spohr, Florida’s Takings Law: A Bark Worse Than Its Bite, 16 VA. ENV’T L. J. 313,
324 (1997) (stating that opponents of state takings statutes oppose them on the grounds that they serve
only to put money in the hands of wealthy property owners).
183. E.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 106-07 (2006) (explaining that many tenants will not receive just compensation because
condemnation terminates the tenant’s lease, which means that the tenant no longer has a protected
property interest); Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and
Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083 (1987)
(exploring whether the landlord or tenant, or both, receive compensation based on their respective
protected property interests); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1254-55 (1967) (stating that
unless property belonging to the tenant is destroyed, “tenants are not constitutionally entitled to . . .
compensat[ion]”).
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restriction often takes the form of conditional construction whereby an owner may
only rebuild contingent on meeting setback requirements or limitations on the
number of times a structure can be rebuilt. 184 This section focuses on the legal
consequences of an ordinance that prevents a property owner from rebuilding
property destroyed by rising sea levels when it is not compliant with setback
requirements. 185
A. Effectiveness of Rebuilding Restrictions as a Tool for Managed Retreat
Rebuilding restrictions are a useful managed retreat tool for several reasons.
First, rebuilding restrictions facilitate managed retreat by requiring property owners
to migrate further inland, out of high-risk areas, if they wish to rebuild destroyed or
damaged structures.186
Second, and perhaps most importantly, rebuilding
restrictions phase out structures that have been grandfathered in as lawful preexisting
nonconforming uses, but which do not meet the existing setback requirements. 187
The continuation of these nonconforming uses is a substantial barrier to transitioning
communities away from high-risk coastal areas.188 Rebuilding restrictions therefore
place limits on the number of times a property owner can repeatedly and indefinitely
rebuild, effectively amortizing the nonconforming use. While eliminating a lawful
preexisting nonconforming use raises constitutional questions, the Law Court has
explicitly acknowledged that abolishing nonconforming uses is not a per se taking,
and should, in fact, be encouraged in the interest of public policy. 189
In addition to gradually eliminating nonconforming uses, managed retreat also
reduces the economic burden on the government and tax base by limiting the number
of times that the public infrastructure required to access coastal areas needs to be
repaired.190 Without a rebuilding restriction or other way of limiting the

184. SIDERS, supra note 91, at 85.
185. The Mandatory Shoreline Zoning Act requires that all municipalities adopt a shoreline
ordinance, which, among other things, mandates minimum structure setbacks. 38 M.R.S.A § 438-A(1)
(2013).
186. Id. Rebuilding restrictions also help mitigate long-term health consequences caused by
continuing to live in once-flooded structures that exposes people to mold growth, causing respiratory
issues. See Manuel, supra note 47, at A152, A157. Rebuilding restrictions also curb the high cost of
owners continually rebuilding their property. See Beth Daley, Houses Wrecked Repeatedly by Sea
Rebuilt with Taxes, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 9, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle
/health-wellness/2014/03/09/sea-level-rose-government-paid-nine-flood-claims-scituate-home
/P9PvgncnRm3pjdQYt8mxuK/story.html [https://perma.cc/5P3C-ZFFU].
187. SIDERS, supra note 91, at 86.
188. Id.
189. See Gagne v. Lewiston, 281 A.2d 579, 581 (Me. 1971) (“The spirit of the zoning ordinances
and regulations is to restrict rather than to increase any nonconforming uses, and to secure their gradual
elimination. Accordingly, provisions of a zoning regulation for the continuation of such uses should be
strictly construed, and provisions limiting nonconforming uses should be liberally construed. The right
to continue a nonconforming use is not a perpetual easement to make a use of one’s property detrimental
to his neighbors and forbidden to them, and nonconforming uses will not be permitted to multiply when
they are harmful or improper . . . . Nonconforming uses are a thorn in the side of proper zoning and
should not be perpetuated any longer than necessary. The policy of zoning is to abolish nonconforming
uses as speedily as justice will permit.” (emphasis added) (quoting Inhabitants of Windham v. Sprague,
219 A.2d 548, 552-53 (Me. 1966))).
190. SIDERS, supra note 91, at 85.
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grandfathering in of nonconforming uses, mandatory setback requirements become
ineffective.191
The Phippsburg, Maine, Shoreline Zoning Ordinance provides a perfect
example of why rebuilding restrictions are necessary. Under the ordinance, all new
structures must be set back at least seventy-five feet from the high-water line.192
However, the ordinance allows the continued nonconformity of structures that
existed prior to the ordinance going into effect. 193 The ordinance further provides
that if a nonconforming structure is “damaged or destroyed by 50% or less of the
market value . . . [the structure] may be reconstructed in place if a permit is obtained
. . . within eighteen (18) months of such damage [or] destruction.” 194 If the structure
is damaged by more than 50% or destroyed, the nonconforming structure can be
reconstructed “to the greatest practical extent [as determined by] the Planning
Board.”195
Thus, a severely damaged nonconforming structure in a high-risk area can be
rebuilt in a nonconforming state (with the Planning Board’s approval) as long as the
reconstruction or replacement does not increase its non-conformity.196 Thus, the
current ordinance allows severely damaged buildings to continuously be rebuilt in
high risk areas with few limitations.197 Furthermore, where the ordinance does place
limits on rebuilding nonconforming structures, the discretion of the Planning Board
creates an avenue for bypassing these existing restrictions. Rebuilding restrictions
seek to address these weaknesses by ensuring that nonconformity does not continue
indefinitely in the face of rising sea levels and that, when buildings are destroyed or
damaged, property owners are not allowed to rebuild in the same location.
1. Rebuilding Restrictions Do Not Pose the Same Risks as Eminent Domain
While any managed retreat tool currently is, and likely will continue to be, a
controversial topic,198 rebuilding restrictions do not pose the same economic threats
as eminent domain. Under eminent domain, the taking of property always requires
just compensation. In contrast, rebuilding restrictions are analyzed on a case by case
basis, and may or may not require compensation depending on whether a property
owner brings suit, the unique attributes of the particular piece of property, and how
a court evaluates this type of claim. 199
191. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations., 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1222, 1283 (2009) (discussing how lawful preexisting nonconforming uses can create perverse
incentives to overinvest in certain areas).
192. PHIPPSBURG, ME., SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE § 15(B) (2012).
193. Id. § 12(A).
194. Id. § 12(C)(3).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. While a building damaged by more than fifty percent still has to go through the local planning
board, this is not necessarily a strong enough gate keeping mechanism, since the decision is left to the
whims of the planning board that may be comprised of lay persons who do not have a comprehensive
understanding of sea level rise, or, perhaps, do not believe in climate change.
198. See Christopher Flavelle, Trump Administration Presses Cities to Evict Homeowners from
Flood Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/climate/governmentland-eviction-floods.html[https://perma.cc/MFJ6-F253].
199. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
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Furthermore, unlike eminent domain, where the government must decide which
property to condemn, the government is not required to make the same determination
with a rebuilding restriction. Instead, nature effectively determines which property
the rebuilding restriction applies to and when depending on how sea level rise and
extreme sea level events progress in a particular area. 200 Finally, because the
government is not required to determine which property the regulation applies to,
there is a decreased risk that the government will unfairly target vulnerable
populations through managed retreat.201
However, the flipside of rebuilding restrictions is that some damage and
destruction (and potential loss of life) must occur before this managed retreat tool
can be utilized. Thus, rebuilding restrictions are not an entirely preventive managed
retreat tool. However, the hope is that if a homebuyer is aware that they will be
restricted from rebuilding if their property is harmed, they will consider that in the
purchase, construction, or reconstruction of a house.
B. Regulatory Takings Challenges to Rebuilding Restrictions
Rebuilding restrictions are likely to be challenged as regulatory takings.202 In
evaluating whether a rebuilding restriction is a regulatory taking, state and federal
courts will apply a series of regulatory takings tests to identify whether the regulation
is functionally equivalent to physical condemnation, such that just compensation is
required.203 In determining whether a rebuilding restriction is a regulatory taking,
courts will look to the per se rule from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, or
perform an ad hoc inquiry under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York.204
1. The Lucas/Seven Islands Standard: A Per Se Analysis
A property owner is likely to argue that a rebuilding restriction falls under the
per se rule of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.205 If the court invokes this
rule, there is no balancing required—just compensation is automatic.206
In 1986, Lucas purchased two residential lots with the intention of constructing
single-family homes.207 Two years after the purchase, South Carolina enacted the
200. See Wolf, supra note 95, at 185 (stating that in defending taking claims, it is important to
“[c]larify[] that the Fifth Amendment applies to government takings not takings by the forces of
nature”).
201. This is not to say that rebuilding restrictions are free from bias, it is merely to say that when a
group of people is responsible for determining who gets to keep their property and who must give it up,
implicit—or sometimes explicit—bias is more likely to creep its way in to the decision-making process.
202. See Wolf, supra note 95, at 189. A property owner may also challenge an ordinance
prohibiting rebuilding on the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious, or that the municipality does not
have the authority to enforce this type of restriction. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 252
Cal. Rptr.3d 817, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
203. See id. at 161.
204. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 124.
205. See Carole Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas:
Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1859-60 (2017).
206. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
207. Id. at 1007.
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Beachfront Management Act, which prevented any new construction or rebuilding
within a fixed coastal area based on specific identified points of erosion. 208 The Act
did not create any exceptions. 209 The trial court made two critical factual findings:
(1) that the Coastal Management Act rendered Lucas’s property “valueless;” and (2)
that the Act was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power intended to protect
a vital public resource.210 In response to the facts before it, the Supreme Court
ultimately created a new per se rule that if a government regulation completely wipes
out all economic value in an owner’s property, the government is required to provide
the property owner with just compensation. 211 However, in his majority opinion,
Justice Scalia also carved out several exceptions to the Lucas per se rule. If the
behavior prohibited by the regulation would have been prohibited under state
nuisance law or “background principles” of property law, the property owner is not
entitled to just compensation.212 However, the exceptions delineated by the Court
blur the per se rule and create a substantial amount of grey area within which to
examine regulatory takings.213
Maine’s current takings standard, as outlined in Seven Island Land Co., requires
the state or local government to pay just compensation when the regulation “would
render the property substantially useless.” 214 The standard thus mirrors the Supreme
Court’s rule from Lucas215 and requires the court to engage in the same analysis. In
the context of rebuilding restrictions, the central regulatory takings issue arising
under Lucas/Seven Islands is whether a rebuilding restriction would render property
completely valueless, such that just compensation is automatically required.
a. Rebuilding Restrictions Are Not Per Se Takings Under the Lucas/Seven Islands
Standard
At first blush, Lucas/Seven Islands appears exactly on point. If the Supreme
Court held that the rebuilding restriction imposed by the Beachfront Management
Act in Lucas was a per se taking then, logically, any other rebuilding restriction
would similarly have the same outcome. However, a deep dive into the decision
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1009.
210. Id. at 1009, 1022.
211. Id. at 1027. If the value of the property has not been completely wiped out, even if the value is
diminished by ninety-five percent, the property owner cannot recover under Lucas. However, the
property owner may be able to recover under the ad hoc balancing test put forth by the Supreme Court
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that the
court must consider “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and . . . the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” in determining whether there
has been a taking, as well as the character of the government action).
212. Id. at 1029; see also Brown & Merriam, supra note 205, at 1858-59 (providing an overview and
analysis of the Lucas exceptions).
213. Brown & Merriam, supra note 205, at 1854-62 (discussing the ambiguities inherent in the
Lucas opinion).
214. See Seven Islands Land Co. v. Me. Land Use Regul. Comm’n, 450 A.2d 475, 482 (Me. 1982).
215. Even though Lucas was decided after Seven Islands, the Law Court has treated these two
takings tests as being interchangeable. See MC Assocs. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2001 ME 89, ¶ 11,
773 A.2d 439 (2001) (citing to Lucas, with approval, in explaining the Seven Islands takings standard);
see also Madden v. Inhabitants of Frankfort, No. AP2012001, 2012 WL 9189533, at *6 (Me. Super. Ct.
Sept. 26, 2012).
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shows that Lucas creates murky precedent at best and does not create a clear-cut
answer to this question.
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court relied on one crucial finding from
the trial court: the regulation rendered Lucas’s land valueless. 216 By relying upon
this factual finding, the Supreme Court did not engage in an analysis of whether the
regulation did, in fact, reduce the economic value of Lucas’s property to zero, nor
did it provide guidance on how lower courts should consider this issue moving
forward.217 As a result, the Supreme Court left open the question of how to analyze
whether the land is “valueless,” although scholars agree that rendering property
completely valueless is difficult.218
In Maine, several state cases at both the trial and appellate court levels have
clearly articulated that coastal property still has economic value, even if the property
owner is prohibited from building on the property. 219 Prior to the Supreme Court’s
holding in Lucas, the Maine Law Court considered, in Hall v. Board of
Environmental Protection, whether the Maine Board of Environmental Protection
(BEP) committed a regulatory taking when it denied a building permit under Maine’s
“Sand Dune Law.”220 The Halls purchased a beach lot, which included a house, for
$30,000.221 Six years later, the Halls lost their home as a result of beach erosion.222
After purchasing the neighboring property for $200, the Halls decided to construct a
new residential structure on the double lot.223 However, the BEP denied a “sand
dune permit,” which prevented the Halls from building a new structure.224
The Halls appealed the administrative decision to the superior court, which
determined that the Halls met their burden of proving that the BEP’s denial of the
permit “render[ed] their property substantially useless.” 225 As a result, the superior
court held that the denial of the permit constituted a taking. 226 The superior court’s
decision was based on two primary findings. First, the court reasoned that there was
216. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007, 1030-31.
217. Id. at 1016 n.7.
218. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1427
(1993) (“[B]ecause environmental protection law almost never result in total economic deprivation, that
categorical presumption will rarely apply.”); Brown & Merriam, supra note 205, at 1849-50 (reviewing
more than 1,700 cases involving Lucas claims and finding that only 27 of these claims were successful
(1.6% of all cases reviewed)).
219. Other jurisdictions treat coastal property similarly. See, e.g., Lindstrom v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 843-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that the plaintiffs were not denied
all beneficial use of the property because they still owned the property and that the structure vulnerable
to bluff erosion could always be reconstructed in a different part of the lot); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV
Homeowners Ass’n v. City of N. Myrtle, 523 S.E.2d 193, 204 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the
destruction of a shared pier was not a taking because the pier was only one component of each property
owner’s lot, which, therefore, meant that the lots retained economic value).
220. Hall v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 528 A.2d 453, 454 (Me. 1987). While Hall was decided before
Lucas, Justice Blackmun cited to Hall in his dissenting opinion in Lucas, using it as an example of how
state courts consistently reason that land still has economic value even when a property owner is
prevented from building. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. Hall, 528 A.2d at 454.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 455.
226. Id.
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no remaining beneficial use of the property available to the Halls without being able
to build a year-round permanent structure.227 Second, the denial of the permit
decreased the value of the Halls’ property from $50,000 to $500, which the court
considered to be approximately a 100% reduction in value. 228
The Law Court reversed the superior court’s decision, holding that the
“beneficial and valuable uses of [the] property remaine[d] available to the Halls
despite the denial of a building permit by the BEP.”229 The Law Court reversed the
lower court’s holding on two primary grounds. First, even without the building
permit, the property still had 150 feet of beach, water access, sewer, and electric
services, so the property could still be used. 230 Importantly, the record stated that
the denial of the permit still allowed the Halls to place a temporary structure, such
as a camper, on the property, which meant that the property still had economic
value.231 Second, the property adjacent to the Halls had been sold for a high price,
suggesting that the Halls would still be able to sell their property for a large sum
should they choose to do so.232
A little over a decade after the Law Court decided Hall, the Law Court similarly
held in Wyer that the denial of a variance that reduced a lot’s assessed value from
$106,000 to $2,600233 was not a taking.234 Even though the owner could not build
on the property, the Law Court held that “[b]ecause of the property’s close proximity
to Higgins Beach in Scarborough, the [lower] court properly considered the uses of
the property for parking, picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses.”235
Similarly, in Fichter the superior court held that a 93% reduction in the value of
a lot from $375,000 to $25,000 was not a per se taking under Lucas/Seven Islands
because (1) the property still had a value of $25,000; (2) the property had recreational
value and could be used for camping, swimming, picnicking, and sunbathing; and
(3) the owners still had access to a private beach, which would mean they would not
have to go to a public one.236 While the public had a right to use the intertidal zone
for fishing, fowling, and navigation, the property was not valueless because the
property owners could engage in alternative activities in the intertidal zone beyond
those permitted under the public trust doctrine. 237
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 456.
230. Id. at 455.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 456.
233. Wyer v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., No. CV-92-1091, 1998 Me. Super LEXIS 96, at *9 (Apr. 14, 1998).
234. Wyer v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 2000 ME 455, ¶ 1, 747 A.2d 192.
235. Id.; see also Wyer, 1998 Me. Super LEXIS 96, at *9. The lower court also considered that
using the land for access to the beach, picnicking, camping, and sunbathing were all beneficial
recreational uses that prevented the land from being valueless. Wyer, 1998 Me. Super LEXIS 96, at *9.
Additionally, the property owners still possessed the right to exclude others from the property, even
though they could not build a permanent structure. Id.
236. Fichter v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., No. CV-90-624, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *12 (Jan. 9,
1997).
237. See id.; see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 180 (Me. 1989) (stating that the public
trust doctrine in Maine only allows access to intertidal zones for fishing, fowling, and navigation.
Access to this land for other recreational activities, such as sunbathing, requires the government to pay
just compensation).
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Although it may be difficult for a plaintiff to argue a Lucas/Seven Islands taking
under the best of circumstances, Hall, Wyer, and Fichter suggest that that fight may
be even more difficult in a Maine court. These cases acknowledge that Maine courts
prize coastal property beyond the ability to build a structure. The right to beach
access, camping, sunbathing, and the ability to invite or restrict others from doing
so, is still highly valued. Anyone who has been to a Maine beach knows that access
to a swath of quiet, private sand is a rare commodity. Maine courts also recognize
that even if a property owner feels as though the property has lost all economic value,
others may not agree. A neighboring property owner may be willing to purchase the
property for beach access, to increase the size of their lot, or as a buffer.238
In a state with so much coastline, it is highly unlikely that a Maine court would
choose to take a legal position that devalues alternate uses of coastal property that
are typically highly valued.239 Because both the trial and appellate courts in Maine
have demonstrated a willingness to find alternative uses for property besides
residential use, it is unlikely that a court would hold that a regulation has wiped out
all economic value in the coastal property. Thus, a rebuilding restriction is not likely
to be a per se regulatory taking under Lucas/Seven Islands.
2. Penn. Central: Applying the Ad Hoc Approach to Rebuilding Restrictions
As Justice Scalia notes in his majority opinion in Lucas, if a property owner is
unsuccessful in persuading the court that the categorical rule from Lucas applies, she
is left to argue her case under the ad hoc balancing test from Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.240 Although never analyzed extensively,
Maine courts have cited to the Penn Central framework in evaluating whether there
has been a regulatory taking.241
Penn Central concerned the validity of a New York City landmark law that
restricted the construction of office space above Grand Central Terminal, which had

238. See Barth v. City of Peabody, No. 15-13794-MBB, 2018 WL 1567606, at *16 (D. Mass. Mar.
30, 2018) (stating that a neighbor offering the plaintiff $1,000 to purchase the non-buildable property
was evidence demonstrating that the property had not lost all economic value). But see Lost Tree Vill.
Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[W]e disagree that all sales qualify as
economic uses. When there are no underlying economic uses, it is unreasonable to define land use as
including the sale of land. Typical economic uses enable a landowner to derive benefits from land
ownership rather than requiring a landowner to sell the affected parcel.”).
239. However, this raises the question of whether alternative uses such as camping, sunbathing, and
beach access is “residual value” that only functions as a “token interest.” See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (“State[s] may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the
landowner is left with a token interest.”).
240. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (stating that a ninety-five percent
decrease in property value is not a complete wipeout of all economic value. The property owner must,
therefore, argue her case under Penn Central rather than Lucas); see also Wyer, 1998 Me. Super LEXIS
96, at *13 (Apr. 14, 1998) (“If [plaintiff] fails to show that he has been deprived of all economic value
in his property, this court will apply the full pre-Lucas test as established in Penn Central.”); Fichter,
1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *13 (Jan. 9, 1997).
241. See, e.g., MC Assocs. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2001 ME 89, ¶¶ 5-6, 773 A.2d 439;
Macquinn v. Town of Lamoine, No. BCD-CV-2017-05, 2018 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 3, at *6-15
(Feb. 13, 2018); Fichter, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *13-18; AIU Ins. v. Superintendent, No. CV89-963, 1991 Me. Super LEXIS 5, at *1-2.
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been designated a “landmark.”242 In holding that the government had not committed
a taking, the Supreme Court formulated an “ad hoc, factual” 243 test requiring the
court to assess the following: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation” 244 on the
property; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations”245 and; (3) the “character of the government
action.”246
In analyzing the first factor, Justice Brennan looked at the diminution in value
caused by the regulation, ultimately reasoning that while the reduction in value was
relevant, diminution in value alone does not work a taking.247 Although the landmark
law at issue in Penn Central unevenly impacted property owners, that alone was
insufficient to prove a violation of the Takings Clause. 248 Concerning the second
factor, the Court observed that when the property owners purchased the Terminal,
they had expected to use it as a train station. 249 The landmark law did not interfere
with or change this expected use; the trains would continue to run as intended. 250
Moreover, the Landmark Commission, which had prohibited the changes to the
Terminal, did not outright ban any construction; instead, the development just had to
fit within the requirements set by the Commission. 251 Finally, the Court reasoned
that the restrictions imposed by the landmark law were “substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare,”252 while also enabling the property owner to make
“reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site.” 253
In applying this same three-part framework to rebuilding restrictions, courts
must balance the Penn Central factors to determine the extent to which a rebuilding
restriction is akin to a physical taking, thus requiring just compensation.
a. The Economic Impact of Rebuilding Restrictions
As discussed in Part III(B)(1)(a), a rebuilding restriction is likely to have a
substantial economic impact on property owners who are restricted from either
entirely rebuilding or rebuilding on part of the property. However, as Hall, Wyer,
and Fichter demonstrate, the Law Court is likely to find other uses for the property. 254
Thus, a diminution in value is not, in and of itself, sufficient to render a taking under

242. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115-19 (1978).
243. Id. at 124.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 131. The Court also argued that because the landmark law conferred transfer
development rights (TDRs) the property owners had not been denied all use of their property. See id. at
113-14, 137 (“[I]t is not literally accurate to say that [the landowners] have been denied all use of even
those preexisting air rights. Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made
transferrable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been
found suitable for the construction of new office buildings.”).
248. Id. at 133-34.
249. Id. at 136.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 137.
252. Id. at 138.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 217-40, and accompanying text.
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the Penn Central analysis.255
b. Rebuilding Restrictions and Investment-Backed Expectations
The second Penn Central factor, interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, is likely to play a central role in whether a rebuilding restriction is a
taking. However, like the first factor, interference with investment-backed
expectations is not dispositive.256 Courts and legal scholars have grappled with
understanding what “distinct investment-back expectations” means in application.257
While the Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance on how courts should
analyze this factor, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, intimated that courts should consider: (1) “the timing of the
regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title,”258 and (2) “the nature and
extent of permitted development under the regulatory regime vis-à-vis the
development sought by the claimant.”259 However, these factors are perhaps neither
necessary nor sufficient, as investment-backed expectations depend on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.260
Rebuilding restrictions pose interesting questions concerning investmentbacked expectations because it requires a court to assess the extent to which our
growing knowledge about climate change renders our cultural conceptions of private
property usage unreasonable. For example, at a literal level, a rebuilding restriction
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations where a landowner
purchased the beachfront property either because the property already had a house
on it, or because they intended to build one. From this perspective, a rebuilding
restriction undercuts the very purpose for which the owner purchased the property.
A court may be reticent to prevent use that was ongoing at the time of acquisition. 261

255. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
256. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
257. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10471, 10475-77 (2009) (discussing ambiguities of investment-backed expectations); Marc
R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 99 (2002) (stating
that distinct investment-backed expectations are too general and that the Court has provided too little
guidance in its application); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27
URB. LAW. 215, 225-37 (1995) (critiquing investment-backed expectations as part of the Penn Central
analysis); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically
Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 106-17 (1996) (discussing the ambiguities
inherent in the investment-backed expectations framework).
258. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Courts [] must attend to those circumstances which are
probative of what fairness requires in a given case.”). Given the absence of concrete guidance, other
courts have developed their own factors for assessing distinct investment-backed expectations. The
Federal Circuit, for example, has developed the following test for determining the reasonableness of
expectations: (1) “whether the plaintiff operate[s] in a highly regulated industry”; (2) “whether the
plaintiff was aware of the problem that spawned the regulation at the time it purchased the allegedly
taken property”; and (3) “whether the plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated the possibility of such
regulation in light of the ‘regulatory environment’ at the time of the purchase.” Appolo Fuels, Inc. v.
United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
261. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (stating that there
was no interference with distinct investment-backed expectations because Penn Central purchased the
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However, this hardline “distinct” investment-backed expectation has since
softened to “reasonable” investment-backed expectations.262 The transition from
“distinct” to “reasonable” is critical to the government withstanding a climatechange-based takings claim. The integration of reasonableness allows the courts to
consider factors external to the property such as shifting social norms, developments
in science, awareness of climate change, and knowledge of sea level rise. All of
these factors shed light on whether it is reasonable for a property owner to expect
that they can continue to use their property unencumbered by government
regulations.263
While the integration of reasonableness is useful in recognizing that over time
and across generations expected and reasonable uses of coastal property change as
society progresses, there is no definite point at which a prior reasonable use of land
(like building a house on the coast) suddenly becomes unreasonable (because of sea
level rise). We are arguably in a transitional period where property rights are being
re-defined in light of climate change and rising sea levels. 264 As such, the rules that
have always applied to property owners are shifting in light of the new information
and concerns about climate change. 265 With little court guidance, climate change
takings exemplify the liminal space somewhere between unreasonable government
action (as defined by our traditional conceptions of property law) and reasonable
government action (as necessitated by the pressing social impacts of sea level rise).
However, as climate change becomes more severe and the need to address its
impacts becomes more pressing, the line between a reasonable and unreasonable

Terminal for use as a train station. Designation as a landmark did not interfere with the continued use of
the Terminal as a train station). At the same time, however, the majority of landowners do not purchase
coastal property solely because of the house, but because the house is in proximity to the ocean. From
this perspective, a rebuilding restriction does not undercut all landowner expectations because the
regulation does not preclude the continued use of the property for sunbathing, camping, and enjoying
the view and proximity to the ocean.
262. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (stating that the ad hoc factual
inquiry from Penn Central requires that the court look at “interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations”); see also Danielle Nicholson, Reasonable Expectations: An Unreasonable
Approach to the Denominator Question in Takings Analysis, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 353, 357-59 (2018)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s transition from “distinct” to “reasonable” investment-backed
expectations); J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When are Investment-Backed Land
Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 85-86 (2006).
263. See Breemer, supra note 262, at 86 (stating that the introduction of “reasonableness” into the
distinct investment-backed expectations analysis “invite[s] examination of the validity of a claimant’s
expectations rather than examination of the effect of regulation in precluding distinctly planned,
profitable uses of land”); see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 620 (2014) (explaining that the transition from “distinct” to
“reasonable” investment-backed expectations changed the analysis from a subjective one to an
objective).
264. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 45 (2003)
(“[R]egulatory transitions are inevitable over the long run, and often represent socially adaptative
responses to changed circumstances or increased information.”); Carol M. Rose, Property and
Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2000) (stating
that takings claims arise during periods of transitions where existing property expectations clash with
new property concerns).
265. See Doremus, supra note 264, at 3 (stating that takings claims arise when there are new rules,
not because of the new rule itself, but because the new rule is simply different than the old rule).
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expectation may become more clearly defined. While there is no bright-line at which
a previously reasonable expectation suddenly becomes unreasonable, what takings
jurisprudence does tell us is that the transformation from reasonable to unreasonable
investment-backed expectations does not occur upon the transfer of property.266
While the Supreme Court has made clear that post-regulation acquisition of property
does not preclude a subsequent landowner from receiving just compensation, 267 an
existing regulation at the time of acquisition bears on the reasonableness of an
owner’s investment-backed expectations.268
Notice of an existing regulation is especially useful in the context of rebuilding
restrictions. Because sea level rise is a gradual process, it is more likely to be
subsequent landowners who will be impacted by the regulation, rather than the
landowner in possession of the property at the time the regulation is enacted. Where
the property is inherited—which is common on Maine's coast—subsequent
generations who know they will inherit the property have notice of both the
regulation and climate change impacts. Having notice substantially decreases the
reasonableness of any expectation to use the land unrestricted.269 As such, local
governments should implement rebuilding restrictions sooner rather than later, to
trigger notice as soon as possible.
While Justice O’Connor has stated that “a takings claim is [not] defeated simply
on account of the lack of a personal financial investment by a postenactment acquirer
of property, such as a donee, heir or devisee[,]”270 this does not address the shifting
of expectations that occurs as property is passed between generations, regardless of
financial investment. As time passes, the awareness of climate change shifts, and
with it, a landowner’s expectation about what she reasonably believes she can do
with her property.
For example, an owner who purchased property in the early 1900s could not
imagine that one day her property would wash away because the seas are rising.
However, her great-great-granddaughter could envision that this is not just a
possibility, but an inevitability. While it may have been reasonable for a property
owner in the 1900s to maintain her property free from government restrictions on
rebuilding, the same cannot be true of her great-great-granddaughter. Because her
great-great-granddaughter is, or should be, aware of sea level rise and is attuned to
other governmental interventions to mitigate climate change, it would be an
unreasonable expectation for her to assume that she will be able to maintain her
nonconforming property in the same location it has always been, free from
government regulations that are intended to protect life, limb, and property.271
266. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628-30 (2001).
267. See id. at 628 (“A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a
claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken.”).
268. See id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Courts properly consider the effect of existing
regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining whether a compensable
taking has occurred.”).
269. Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of Rising Seas
Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 239, 257
(2011).
270. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
271. See Fichter v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., No. CV-90-624, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 13, at *15 (Jan.
9, 1997) (discussing Avenal v. United States, explaining that when property owners purchased oyster
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However, while a property owner may be on notice of rising sea levels and could
foreseeably see a time when her home can no longer be located where it is, a
landowner could arguably assert that she could not have foreseen governmental
intervention in this natural process.272 In conducting a Penn Central analysis, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina articulated
that, while landowners were on notice that the beachfront might erode to such a
degree that repair was no longer possible, “the Owners rightly expected that the
Town would not attempt to accelerate that process through its unauthorized assertion
of the public trust doctrine.”273 The town condemned the beachfront because it was
a nuisance and was located in the public trust area after a storm damaged the
property.274
However, it is yet to be determined whether this same logic applies to awareness
of sea level rise. Coastal homeowners are not only aware of rising sea levels, but
many are already experiencing the effects of harsher winter storms and increased
flooding during king tides. These effects, in essence, put the property owner on
notice that at some point, sea levels will rise to such a degree that the location of their
home is no longer safe or practical.275 Furthermore, the rebuilding restriction is a
reasonable and effective solution to the problem. Landowners could, therefore,
expect that the government would preclude building in specific locations.
c. The Character of the Taking
While interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations may tilt in
favor of a property owner, the character of, and underlying rationales for,
implementing the rebuilding restriction are essential to tip the balance back in favor
of the government. In his majority opinion in Penn Central, Justice Brennan
contemplated that, with respect to its character, a taking is more likely to have
occurred where the property experiences something akin to a physical invasion (akin
to Loretto),276 rather than when the “interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” 277
What Justice Brennan suggests is that where the government can connect a regulation
to the governmental police powers, a court is less likely to characterize it as a taking,
beds they should have been aware that the government and oyster industry were beginning to address
environmental concerns that had started in the 1950s).
272. While there has been a great deal of publicity about rising sea levels, we are still trying to
convince climate change skeptics of its existence. See, e.g., Spencer Bokat-Lindell, So You Want to
Convince a Climate Change Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02
/opinion/climate-change-deniers.html [https://perma.cc/4RHV-8XLY].
273. See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 97 F. Supp. 3d 713, 734 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
274. Id. at 718.
275. See Craig, supra note 36, at 109 (“[F]ew would grant private landowners a reasonable
expectation of being able to significantly increase the risk of disease, poisoning, or catastrophic harm for
the rest of the community.”). While Professor Kundis’s argument is compelling, in practice it raises
difficult questions of causation—is it the specific landowner that causes the disease or harm by failing to
relocate, or is it climate change that causes this harm?
276. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
277. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The importance of this
third prong has likely decreased since the Supreme Court’s holding in Loretto, which created a separate
per se rule to deal with physical invasions authorized by the government. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
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as long as it does not fall into a per se takings category.278 Framing the character of
the rebuilding restriction in terms of benefitting the common good requires that
governments—and their lawyers—draw on well-researched, peer-reviewed studies
detailing the extent of the harm the government seeks to prevent.
While a local government may choose to couch its arguments in its authority to
promote the general welfare through the enactment of land use restrictions and
zoning ordinances,279 it can also use its power to protect public health and safety. 280
Outside of the takings context, courts recognize that state and local governments play
a critical role in exercising their police powers to maintain public health and safety.
For example, state and local governments can use their police powers to limit the
spread of disease.281 In what has become one of the most important Supreme Court
cases outlining the boundaries of the police power, the Court emphasized that
individual rights may be restricted where a threat to public health is present, stating:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within
its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times
and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. There are manifold restraints
to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based
on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with
disorder and anarchy.282

Based on the deference that courts typically give to states in protecting the health
of their citizens, governments would do well to emphasize the severe health
consequences that they are seeking to avoid by implementing rebuilding restrictions
that facilitate managed retreat.283 Preventing people from rebuilding damaged homes
would protect public health in the following ways: (1) minimizing loss of life by
preventing people from living in hazardous coastal areas that are most susceptible to
flooding, storm surge, and extreme sea level events; (2) decreasing respiratory
problems by preventing people from moving back into homes that have been
waterlogged and are susceptible to mold growth; (3) minimizing the long-term
mental health impacts of homes being cyclically rebuilt and destroyed; (4)
preventing exposure to communicable diseases from sewage runoff and postflooding mosquito activity; and (5) decreasing the risk of well and aquifer

278. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 (stating that the landmark regulation was related to
the promotion of the general welfare).
279. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392-97 (1926) (upholding the
constitutionality of zoning laws as a legitimate exercise of the police power).
280. See Craig, supra note 36, at 109 (“[C]ourts are far more solicitous of police power arguments
based on the traditional kinds of public health protections than they are of states acting purely through
their land use planning powers.”).
281. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283 (1999) (“[E]fforts to protect public health and safety are clearly within [a]
city’s police powers.”).
282. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. But see Wendy K. Mariner, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not
Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 581, 581-90 (2005)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has become increasingly protective of individual rights in the modern
era and that state laws are likely to be upheld where they have a legitimate public purpose).
283. See Craig, supra note 36, at 109.
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salinization and contamination.284
In addition to emphasizing the public health justifications for implementing a
rebuilding restriction to move people from vulnerable coastal areas, the government
should also stress its role in protecting Maine’s natural ecology. As this Comment
has explored, Maine’s wetlands, marshes, and coastlines serve as both a vital
component of Maine’s economy and environment. As the Law Court has stated,
“[w]etlands represent[] a ‘valuable natural resource of the State[]’ . . . [that are] of
statewide concern.”285 Thus, rebuilding restrictions help preserve Maine’s natural
ecology by creating new spaces for marshes and wetlands to expand into, thereby
ensuring that the coastline has a natural buffer. This buffer would protect inland
communities from flooding and storms, ultimately preserving public health and
safety. Furthermore, moving people back from the coastline ensures that as sea
levels rise—and with them, the mean highwater mark—the public still has access to
coastal resources through the public trust. 286 Ensuring access to coastal areas held
by the state in public trust may, in turn, preserve the coastal economy on which
Maine relies.
Finally, defining a rebuilding restriction as a harm prevention measure ensures
that there is some “reciprocity of advantage”287 or “implicit in-kind compensation”288
for the property owner. While she may not be able to rebuild her structure in the
exact location, the rebuilding restriction benefits her by creating a mandatory buffer.
This new buffer zone physically protects the new structure that she has constructed,
and also protects the monetary investment that she made in the building. The
landowner could argue that the buffer zone is the equivalent of the government
building a wall and that the government is constructively possessing property and
exacting a partial physical taking.289 However, if the government wanted to build an
actual sea wall, it would buy the property and do so. The government is not
physically possessing this property, nor is it requiring any physical construction. As
such, the buffer should be treated as a regulation. Moreover, the buffer benefits the
landowner directly. While the rebuilding restriction undoubtedly creates a burden
on the property owner, it also affords the property owner the same benefits that inland
landowners experience.
The consequences of rising sea levels are so extreme and so undeniable that even
a property owner challenging a rebuilding restriction is likely to admit that the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of coastal
property owners. Thus, it is expected that the third Penn Central factor will lean in
favor of the government, although, as with each of these factors, it is not dispositive.

284. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
285. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
286. Cf. Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 7 F. Supp. 3d 713, 717, 734 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing
nuisance law, the public trust doctrine, and takings law in the context of post-storm beach erosion).
287. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
288. See generally Brian A. Lee, Average Reciprocity of Advantage, BROOKLYN L. SCH. LEGAL
STUD. RSCH. PAPERS, No. 410, at 2, 2-24 (May 4, 2014).
289. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2429-30 (2015) (holding, in the context of the
National Raisin Reserve, that government appropriation of some part of an owner’s property, even
where the owner receives some benefit in return, is nonetheless a taking).
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C. The Government Stands a Good Chance of Defeating a Takings Claim
While some coastal property has attributes that would make the property owner
more likely to succeed in a takings claim, the government has a good chance of
surviving a takings claim against a rebuilding restriction. Assuming that the
regulation does not entirely wipe out all viable economic uses, the Penn Central
factors provide enough flexibility for the government to justify managed retreat and
rebuilding restrictions. In many ways, whether the government can withstand a
takings claim depends on how the court conceptualizes private property. Whether
the court defines private property in its most restrictive and protective terms, or
whether the court is willing to grapple with the tensions between public benefits and
private property rights laid bare by climate change, will define the outcome of any
litigation. Assuming that a property owner does not succeed in bringing a takings
claim, the government will not be required to pay just compensation.
V. THE ETHICS OF REBUILDING RESTRICTIONS
Between eminent domain and rebuilding restrictions, the latter is by far the
better and, arguably, more ethical 290 method of managed retreat. If rebuilding
restrictions are not takings under the Maine or U.S. Constitutions, the government
does not have to pay just compensation according to fair market value of the
property. Without having to do so, the government has the discretion to allocate
funds according to need rather than property value. If the government has the
discretion to distribute funds of its own accord, it can equitably allocate them
according to principles of distributive justice to benefit those who are most
disadvantaged.
The reality is that a rebuilding restriction is likely to have a tremendous impact
on a property owner. To pretend otherwise would lead to misguided implementation
and poor planning. While it may seem harsh to assert that coastal property owners
will not, and should not, receive just compensation, the reality is that our current just
compensation framework, as created by the Takings Clause, is not designed to
address the significant changes in property law created by climate change and sea
level rise. There are too many people in vulnerable coastal areas. If the government
were required to pay just compensation, based on fair market value, to every property
owner on the coast, the cost would be astronomical. As a result of the cost, the
government will continually shy away from any action that runs the risk of a takings
claim.291
However, by not being locked into a just compensation framework that is based
290. Ethical in the sense that if governments are not pigeonholed into the eminent domain
framework, governments have the flexibility to develop climate-change adaptation programs that are
designed around equitable (not necessarily equal) resource distribution, and which take into account the
impacts on historically disadvantaged and marginalized groups. This theory goes against John Rawls’s
principle of justice and “veil of ignorance,” in which resources are distributed without knowledge or
consideration of race, gender, income, class, etc., see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971),
as it recognizes that we must take into consideration the reality of our present social and political
circumstances if we are to develop equitable responses to climate change.
291. See Spohr, supra note 182, at 324 (explaining that opponents of takings statutes argue that these
statutes “potentially eviscerate certain government programs . . . by discouraging governments from
acting against harmful uses of land”).
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on fair market value, the government is free to develop a new compensation scheme
specifically tailored to the unique circumstances of rising sea levels and managed
retreat. This new type of compensation framework should be based on genuine need
and fundamental human rights to adequate shelter and housing.292
Instead of providing compensation based on fair market value, the government
could instead provide everyone who will need to relocate a set stipend to offset
rebuilding or relocation costs. Everyone receives the same amount regardless of the
value of their property (everyone is treated equally). If the property is worth more
than the set “stipend,” any additional money that the government would have paid
the property owner, had this been a taking, goes into a separate fund to provide
additional financial support to those who need it (additional resources are provided
equitably). Thus, the money that is saved by implementing rebuilding restrictions,
rather than eminent domain, can go towards funding programs that help vulnerable
populations relocate.
If the government does not have to pay millions to property owners (whose
property in Maine may be their second or third homes), the government can
reallocate that money to a social safety net compensation and relocation program. If
implemented correctly, this type of social safety net program serves the dual purpose
of ensuring that, as a matter of human rights, basic human needs are met, while also
shaking up our current wealth inequality system. 293 By not providing the most
compensation to the people who ostensibly need it the least, extreme wealth
inequality in the United States, while unlikely to even out entirely, could potentially
decrease. In this same vein, giving vulnerable populations assistance with relocation
provides a vital opportunity to restructure our cities and communities in more
equitable ways. In this respect, managed retreat is not an indication of defeat, but a
292. See OFF. OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., FACT SHEET NO. 21, THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 3-8 (2009),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/FactSheet21en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWS5-TPKK]; see also
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 1948).
293. See generally Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income
Inequality, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL. PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-inincome-inequality [https://perma.cc/JA9N-TDVZ] (detailing that income concentration in the top 1% of
the population has increased substantially since the 1970s); Juliana Menasce Horowitz et al., Most
Americans Say There Is Too Much Economic Inequality in the U.S., but Fewer Than Half Call it a Top
Priority, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/01/09/most-americanssay-there-is-too-much-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s-but-fewer-than-half-call-it-a-top-priority/
[https://perma.cc/7MR3-PKDK] (“Economic inequality, whether measured through gaps in income or
wealth between richer and poorer households, continues to widen.”); Pedro Nicolaci da Costa,
America’s Humongous Wealth Gap is Widening Further, FORBES (May 29, 2019, 12:10 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pedrodacosta/2019/05/29/americas-humungous-wealth-gap-is-wideningfurther/#35f6219d42ee [https://perma.cc/2NEX-HN7U] (“In 2018, the richest 10% held 70% of the total
household wealth, up from 60% in 1989.”); Michael Batty et al., Michael Batty et al., Introducing the
Distributional Finance Accounts of the United States, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, DIV. OF
RSCH. & STAT. & MONETARY AFFS., FED. RSRV. BD., Mar. 2019, at 26,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019017pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7DH-VGJR]
(“The increase in the wealth share of the top 10% came at the expense of households in the 50th to 90th
percentiles of the wealth distribution . . . whose share decreased from 36 percent to 29 percent over this
period.”).
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unique opportunity to recreate our communities and redistribute wealth that would
not otherwise be possible, were the seas not taking our coasts.
Ultimately, climate change requires that we develop a new understanding of
what “just compensation” means in light of property changes that were unforeseeable
when the Founding Fathers wrote the Takings Clause. The question of just
compensation in this particular context raises issues of the purpose of just
compensation. If just compensation is meant to replace the value of a home, that is
very different from providing property owners with the resources necessary to move.
294
In many ways, climate change potentially shifts our understanding of what “just
compensation” does, or should, mean, which in turn alters our current understanding
of property. If the goal is to achieve equitable and ethical compensation, this shift is
necessary. Thus, even if the government were required to use eminent domain (or if
a rebuilding restriction was held a taking), courts should nonetheless reconceptualize
“just compensation” as the amount of money needed to relocate, rather than fair
market value of the land seized.
CONCLUSION
The fact of the matter is that our current takings jurisprudence is not equipped
to address the brave new world of climate change, nor are our current responses to
rising sea levels sufficient. Moving forward, local and state governments need to
think strategically about how to equitably minimize risk to citizens living on the coast
through the planned implementation of managed retreat. However, this also means
that judges, lawyers, and the courts need to consider how takings jurisprudence that
was designed pre-understanding of climate change applies in the context of current
events that our framers could never have dreamed of. A strict application of current
takings jurisprudence to methods of managed retreat will disincentivize necessary
government action, while also failing to meet the needs of vulnerable communities
who need assistance relocating. Thus, the goal should be to develop a method of
managed retreat that facilitates movement away from coastal areas while
simultaneously avoiding a narrow application of the Takings Clause. Through
managed retreat regulations, governments can develop a climate change/sea level
rise-specific compensation scheme that more accurately addresses the needs of
communities as they relocate.
Tackling sea level rise is no easy task and requires coordination between all
levels and branches of government. The government must proactively take steps to
transition away from vulnerable coastal areas, but the courts must subsequently
ensure that this is legally possible. Climate change will be devastating, and it will
be more so for certain groups than others. Climate change will challenge our way of
life. It will challenge our assumptions of both the role of government and the courts.
To minimize the potentially devastating effects of sea level rise on vulnerable
populations in the short term, the government should avoid the Takings Clause where
possible. In the long run, we need to reconceptualize our views of private property
294. See Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 391, 401-04 (2015) (explaining
that there are several different justifications for compensation: restitution or punishment, alleviating a
loss not caused by any particular person or entity, compensation for an “efficient breach” of contract,
and “constitutive compensation”).
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in such a way that allows consideration of the effects of private ownership on our
communities.
Whether we like it or not, the seas are rising. The question then becomes
whether we, too, will rise to meet this challenge.

